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February 16, 1990

HAND-DELIVERED
Geoffrey J. Butler
Supreme Court Clerk
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Gold Standard. Inc. v. American Barrick, et. al.
Case No. 890205

Dear Mr. Butler:
On February 9, 1990, Gold Standard submitted supplemental
authority, purportedly concerning "whether information obtained
outside of the formal discovery process can be regulated by a
protective order . . ." Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), defendants Texaco
and Getty respond to Gold Standard's supplemental filing by
providing the court with cases that have found that a trial court
does have authority to regulate "informal" discovery under Civ. P.
Rule 26(b).
Durflinaer v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984).
Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, 549 A.2d 950, 959
(1988) .
Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857, 864-65
(1985).
These citations respond to Gold Standard's letter and further
support Texaco's and Getty's argument in its Brief at Section IV.,
pp. 46-49.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

BJR:pls
Enclosures
cc: James S. Lowrie, Esq.
Gordon L. Roberts, Esq
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ceeds is delayed through no fault of the
debtor. See Thorsby v. Babcock. 36 Cal.2d
202, 222 P.2d 863 (1950). The California
and Oregon statutes are similar in relevant
respects. Both require reinvestment within
a fixed period of time; neither explicitly
provides for tolling of that period pending
receipt of the proceeds. Both the Oregon
and the California Supreme Courts have
held that the homestead exemption is to be
construed liberally and against forfeiture.
See id.; DeHaven & Son Hardware v.
Schultz, 122 Or. 493. 496, 259 P. 778 (1927).
We decline to hold at this time, however,
that Oregon courts must follow Thorsby.
That issue should be considered in the first
instance by the district court.
We cannot determine whether White satisfies the third requirement. Neither the
bankruptcy court nor the district court determined whether he held the proceeds with
the intent to reinvest them in another
homestead. The district court shall also
address this issue upon remand.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
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Irvin L. DURFLINGER, Raymond Durflinger, and Ronald Durflinger,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Benjamin ARTILES, Preciosa Rosales,
and Eduardo Medrano,
Defendants-Appellants,
Kansas Psychiatric Association,
Amicus Curiae.
No. 81-1744.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Jan. 27, 1984.
Decedents* husband and father, on behalf of himself and his surviving sons,

brought wrongful death action against hospital and physicians who participated in decision to discharge patient who thereafter
killed plaintiff's wife and son. Following
jury verdict for plaintiff, the defendants
moved for new trial. The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas,
Frank G. Theis, Chief Judge, 563 F.Supp.
322, denied motion, and defendants appealed. After receiving answer certified to
Kansas Supreme Court, 234 Kan. 484, 673
P.2d 86, the Court of Appeals, William E.
Doyle, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) clinical
psychologist was competent to testify on
proper standards applicable to decision to
discharge patient; (2) trial judge's exclusion of one of defendants' proffered experts
was justified due to defendants' violation of
discovery provisions of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; (3) defendants' theory of
contributory negligence was not valid; and
(4) admission of videotape of patient, which
was made during his confession to police on
day of murders, was not erroneous.
Affirmed.

1. Federal Civil Procedure <&=>2011
Federal Courts <s=>823
Decisions on relevance of testimony
and competence of witness are within broad
discretion of trial judge and will only be
reversed on showing of abuse of discretion.
2. Evidence <s=>538
Where physicians were members of
team engaged in psychological inquiry, all
team members agreed to discharge from
mental hospital, as not dangerous to himself
or others, patient who six days after discharge shot and killed his mother and
brother, and decision involved psychological
rather than medical inquiry, clinical psychologist was competent to testify on proper standards applicable to discharge decision.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1276
Trial judge was justified in excluding
proffered expert's testimony, where in re-
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taining and presenting expert, defendants
in wrongful death action violated discovery
provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when, upon learning of plaintiffs' decision not to call that expert, defendants contacted expert and requested copy of report
he had prepared for plaintiffs. Fed.Rules
Civ.ProaRules 26, 26(b)(4)(B), 26 note, 28
U.S.C.A.
4. Physicians and Surgeons ®=>7
Where plaintiffs in wrongful death action alleged negligence on part of doctors in
discharging foreseeably violent mental patient, theory of contributory negligence
based on volatile family situation and abusive history that patient endured while
growing up was not valid.
5. Evidence <&=>512
Doctor's deposition testimony was
clearly relevant in wrongful death action
based upon discharge from state hospital of
mentally ill patient, where doctor was psychiatrist who found patient to be danger
to himself and others and recommended
hospitalization.
6. Federal Courts <®=>898
Even if doctor testified as lay witness
and not as expert, failure to limit his deposition testimony to his conclusions based
upon his own observations and not those
based upon second physician was not reversible error, where second physician testified at trial on same issue as first doctor's
deposition testimony.
7. Evidence <fc=>359(6)
Trial court did not commit abuse of
discretion in finding that videotape of former mental patient, made during his confession to police on day of murders of his
mother and brother, was relevant in wrongful death action brought against team of
doctors who had approved patient's discharge from hospital, where videotape was
made less than one week after discharge.
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 401, 28 U.S.C.A.
8. Evidence $=>359(6)
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in admitting videotape of former mental
patient, made during his confession to po-
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lice on day of murders of his mother and
brother, where former mental patient did
not appear as raving incompetent on videotape, videotape suggested patient was very
much m control of his outward behavior,
and tape could arguably benefit either of
parties in wrongful death action brought
against team of doctors who had found
patient was not dangerous to himself or
others and had recommended his release
from hospital less than one week before
murders.
9. Federal Courts <s=>822
Standard of review for alleged improper conduct of counsel is whether trial court
abused its discretion.
10. Federal Courts c=>908
Where instructions given to jury in
wrongful death action contained substantially same information as defendants' proposed versions, and instructions correctly
stated law governing case and were fair to
all parties, instructions did not constitute
reversible error.
Deborah Carney, Turner & Boisseau,
Wichita, Kan. (Christopher Randall, Turner
& Boisseau, Wichita, Kan., on briefs), for
plaintiffs-appellees.
Reid Stacey, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Kan.,
Topeka, Kan. (Robert T. Stephan, Atty.
Gen. of Kan., Topeka, Kan., on briefs), for
defendants-appellants.
John E. Wilkinson, Topeka, Kan., filed an
amicus curiae brief on behalf of The Kan.
Psychiatric Ass'n.
Before DOYLE, LOGAN and
MOUR, Circuit Judges.

SEY-

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.
This is a wrongful death action against
several doctors employed by Larned State
Hospital in Larned Kansas. The defendants in this action are Drs. Artiles, Rosales,
and Medrano.
A detailed recitation of the facts can be
found in the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion. See Appendix, infra. We provide a
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skeletal version of the facts below. On
January 7, 1974, after contemplating murdering his grandparents, Bradley Durflinger was found mentally ill by a probate
judge and ordered to enter Lamed State
Hospital On April 19,1974, the defendants
found that Bradley was not dangerous to
himself or others and recommended his release from the hospital. On April 25, 1974,
Bradley shot and killed his mother and
brother.
Inasmuch as the instant action presented
issues arising out of Kansas law, we submitted an interrogatory to the Supreme
Court of Kansas and now have received an
opinion answering the questions that were
certified to the Kansas Court. That Court
held as follows:
1. A claim arising out of a negligent
release of a patient who has violent propensities poses a valid cause of action.
Physicians have a duty to use reasonable
and ordinary care and discretion in making a recommendation to release such a
patient This duty is owed to the patient
and the public.
2. At least as to causes of action, such as
this one, arising before enactment of the
1979 Kansas Tort Claims Act, staff doctors of a state mental institution are not
immune from civil liability resulting from
release or failure to warn of the release
of a dangerous patient.
We accept these determinations by the
Kansas Supreme Court. The full opinion
by that court, 234 Kan. 484, 673 P.2d 86, is
incorporated herein as an appendix to this
opinion.
Several issues remain to be decided by
this court
I. DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS:
[1] The defendants raise several challenges to the trial judge's decisions to admit
and exclude the testimony of certain proffered witnesses. After considering the various arguments, we conclude that the trial
judge acted properly in rendering his decisions. Decisions on relevance of testimony
and competence of witnesses are within the
broad discretion of the trial judge and will

only be reversed on a showing of abuse of
discretion. Mason v. United States, 719
F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir.1983); Scholz
Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860 (10th
Cir.1979). At no time did the trial court
abuse its discretion.
A. Testimony of Dr. O'Connor:
Defendants challenge the competence of
plaintiffs' expert witness on the ground
that he was licensed and trained in a different discipline than the defendants. The
expert, Dr. William O'Connor, has several
advanced degrees in clinical psychology and
extensive experience in institutional procedure and mental patient evaluation. Defendants argue that notwithstanding his
experience and training, Dr. O'Connor is
not a medical doctor and is thus incompetent to testify on the standard of care expected of the defendant medical doctors on
the team that made the challenged discharge decision. They cite Kansas law
holding that a medical malpractice defendant must be evaluated according to the
standards of his or her particular discipline.
Webb v. Lungstrum, 223 Kan. 487, 575 P.2d
22 (1978); Hiatt v. Groce, 215 Kan. 14, 523
P.2d 320 (1974).
The trial judge considered and rejected
defendants* contention. He conceded that
he would "doubt that you could have a foot
doctor testify as to the qualifications of a
cardiologist," but held that this case involves psychological evaluation and technique common to psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
[2] We are in agreement with the trial
court on this. This is not a case in which
medical training or competence is at issue.
The defendant physicians were members of
a team engaged in psychological inquiry.
Indeed, one of the original defendants, who
settled before trial, was a clinical psychologist. All the team members agreed to discharge Bradley Durflinger, and all considered the same historical and diagnostic
information. The decision involved psychological rather than medical inquiry, and a
clinical psychologist such as Dr. O'Connor
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has competence to testify on the proper
standards applicable to such a decision.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in admitting Dr. O'Connor's testimony.
B. Testimony of Dr. Dyck:
[3] The defendants also challenge the
trial judge's exclusion of one of their proffered experts, a psychiatrist named Dr.
Dyck. The trial judge was justified in excluding Dr. Dyck's testimony. In retaining
and presenting Dr. Dyck, the defendants
violated the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial
court was within its discretion in excluding
the testimony of the witness on these
grounds.
Plaintiffs had originally retained Dr.
Dyck as a consultant, and designated him as
a probable witness in presenting their case.
Subsequently, they decided not to use him
as a witness, and so informed defendants.
Plaintiffs did not give defendants any information about the substance of Dr.
Dyck's evaluation because they had decided
not to call him to the witness stand. Upon
learning of plaintiffs' decision not to call
Dr. Dyck, defendants contacted Dr. Dyck
and requested a copy of the report he prepared for the plaintiffs. He sent them a
copy of the evaluation and the defendants
sought at trial to call him as their witness.
In proceeding in this rather unorthodox
fashion, defendants violated Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
26(bX4)(B) provides that:
A party may discover facts known or
opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected
to be called as a witness at trial, only
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
The rule is designed to promote fairness by
precluding unreasonable access to an opposing party's diligent trial preparation. See
Advisory Committee Notes, Fed.R.Civ.P.

26(b)(4)(B); Ager v. Jane C. Stormont
Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622
F.2d 496, 502 (10th Cir.1980). Under the
standards articulated in Ager, supra at 501,
Dr. Dyck was certainly an "expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation."
He prepared a report for plaintiffs after the
case was filed. This was based on information furnished to him by plaintiffs. He was
paid by plaintiffs for his services. In obtaining his report and assistance, defendants failed to make the necessary showing
of special need to the court Had they
made a showing, there is small possibility
that they could have prevailed; they had an
expert testify on the same psychological
principles and procedures, and could probably have obtained others with little difficulty.
In proceeding as they did, defendants circumvented the discovery process and subverted the principle of fairness that underlies Rule 26(b)(4XB). Defendants' disregard of the Rule, coupled with the prejudice
Dr. Dyck's specially informed opinion might
work on plaintiffs' case, justified the trial
court's exclusion of the proffered evidence.
The exclusion worked no hardship on defendants because they presented another
expert on the same subject. So, our holding is that the trial judge acted within his
discretion. In different circumstances we
recognize that a trial judge might not be
required to exclude the testimony of a witness consulted in violation of the rules of
discovery.
C. Testimony of Bradley Durflinger and
Reverend Holgate:
Defendants argue that the trial judge
erred in excluding the testimony of Bradley
Durflinger and Reverend Holgate. Specifically, they argue that those two witnesses
would have testified to the volatile family
situation and abusive history that Bradley
endured while growing up. Defendants argue that this testimony is relevant to their
defense of plaintiffs' contributory negligence in the deaths of Margaret and Corwin Durflinger.
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[4] The trial judge ruled that the defendants' theory of contributory negligence
was invalid, and excluded the testimony as
irrelevant. We agree. The plaintiffs in
this case allege negligence in discharging a
foreseeably violent mental patient. Defendants might be permitted to argue contributory negligence if the plaintiffs had
contributed to the decision to discharge
Bradley or if they had provoked Bradley to
act violently. At the trial, however, defendants did not proceed on either of these
grounds. Defendants sought to prove that
plaintiffs' past abuse or neglect led or contributed to the deaths. This does not establish contributory negligence. Contributory
negligence is not established unless there
exists proof of past mistreatment of Bradley which proximately caused or contributed to his violence.
Negligence is the proximate cause of an
injury when it appears that "the injury
was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act,
and that it ought to have been foreseen
in the light of the attending circumstances.
fleece Const Co., Inc. v. State Highway
Comm'n., 6 Kan.App.2d 188, 627 P.2d 361,
364 (1981) (quoting Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co. v. Weeks, 72 Kan. 190, 83 P. 406
(1905)). Even if plaintiffs had mistreated
or neglected Bradley in the past, defendants offered no evidence that the deaths of
Margaret and Corwin Durflinger could reasonably be called a "natural and probable
consequence" of the plaintiffs' past treatment of Bradley. Because they could not
demonstrate that Bradley's alleged childhood suffering proximately caused or contributed to Bradley's violent outburst, the
trial judge properly rejected their proffered
theory of contributory negligence.
D. Deposition of Dr. Moore:
In addition to their challenge to the trial
courTs rulings on witnesses, the defendants
argue that the trial court improperly admitted the deposition of Dr. Federick Moore.
Dr. Moore is the psychiatrist who, following
the incident with Bradley's grandparents,
found Bradley Durflinger to be a danger to

himself and others arid recommended hospitalization. The defendants contend that his
deposition testimony was irrelevant and
based on facts not within his personal
knowledge. Neither of these arguments
commands a reversal here.
[5] Dr. Moore's deposition testimony
was clearly relevant. He was the director
of the Mental Health Institute charged by
the Probate Court with evaluating Bradley
Durflinger. His observations and conclusions are germane to the issue of Bradley's
mental condition on admission to the hospital and his need for therapy. The defendants' relevancy objection is unfounded.
The defendants also challenge the deposition on the ground that it contains testimony based on facts not within Dr. Moore's
personal knowledge. The record is not
clear whether Dr. Moore was an expert
witness or merely a lay witness to certain
facts at issue in the case. The standards
applied to lay and expert witnesses differ.
Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides: "A Pay] witness may not testify
to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter." Rule
703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits an expert to base an opinion on any
facts or data, admissible or not, which are
"of a type reasonably relied on by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences on the subject." In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301,1309
(9th Cir.1982) (quoting Rule 703). In drafting this rule, the Advisory Committee noted
that "the rule is designed to broaden the
basis for expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the
judicial practice into line with the practice
of the experts themselves when not in
court." Advisory Committee Notes, Fe&R
Evid. 703.
[6] In their brief, defendants suggest
that Dr. Moore is to be treated as an expert
If this is so, then his conclusions based in
part on data and reports prepared by Dr.
Strange, a psychologist colleague, in reaching a conclusion on Bradley's condition and
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prognosis was properly in evidence. He
could and did reasonably rely on this information in forming his professional opinion.
Aircrash, 684 F.2d at 1314 (9th Cir.1982)
(expert permitted to testify on pilot competence based on flight training records).
If Dr. Moore served as a lay witness, the
deposition testimony should have been limited to his conclusions based on his own
observations. The conclusions based upon
Dr. Strange's observations should have been
excluded. This possible error in the trial
judge's ruling, however, does not require
reversal of this case. "Even if there is
error, reversal is appropriate only if we can
say that the error affected the substantial
rights of the parties." Aircrash, supra at
1313; Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. No substantial
rights were affected by this alleged error.
Dr. Strange testified at trial on the same
issue as Dr. Moore's deposition testimony.
Moreover, the Probate Court records were
already in evidence. The evidence challenged here was cumulative at worst, and
did not substantially damage defendants'
case.
E. Videotape of Bradley Durflinger:
Defendants assert that the trial court erroneously admitted a videotape of Bradley
Durflinger, which was made during his confession to the police on the day of the
murders. Defendants maintain that this
evidence of Bradley Durflinger's behavior
subsequent to his discharge from Larned
State Hospital is irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
[7] The trial court received the videotape on the grounds that it was relevant to
Bradley Durflinger's state of mind and demeanor and to the similarity of conduct
between the contemplated murder of his
grandparents and the actual murder of his
mother and brother. The trial judge cautioned the jury that the tape was received
and could be considered for limited purposes. The videotaped confession at issue
meets the test of relevancy set forth in
Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Relevant
evidence within the meaning of Rule 401 is
evidence "having any tendency to make the
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existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." The videotape of
Bradley Durflinger, made less than a week
after his discharge from Larned State Hospital meets this broad definition of relevancy. While this court may question the
weight to be given to evidence of Bradley's
activities subsequent to his discharge, it
cannot be said that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in finding that
the evidence was relevant.
The contention of defendant that admitting this relevant evidence prejudiced the
jury is a harder one. Other courts have
grappled with the question of whether the
admission of a videotape into evidence violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule
403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . . "
In deciding whether evidence is admissible
under Rule 403, a trial judge must weigh
the probative value of the challenged evidence against the probability of prejudice.
Thomas v. C.G. Tate Const Co., Inc., 465
F.Supp. 566 (D.S.C.1979). Thus the decision
is based on the exercise of discretion.
In Thomas, supra, the court excluded a
proffered videotape. The videotape portrayed, in graphic detail, the pain and suffering experienced by the plaintiff as he
underwent therapy for burns he received as
a result of an automobile accident. The
court noted that the tape would nauseate a
squeamish individual. As part of its ruling,
the court recognized the probable inflammatory effect the film would have on a
jury, as well as the fact that the plaintiff
could instead present the same evidence
through the testimony of the plaintiff, his
wife, doctor and therapist. In addition, the
court recognized that the videotape format,
without regard to its content, would stand
out in the minds of jurors.
In Grimes v. Employers Mut Liab. Ins.
Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D.Alaska, 1977), the
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court allowed a portion of a videotape to be
shown. The film depicted the plaintiff (the
victim of an industrial accident) performing
daily activities. The court ruled that the
films "illustrate, better than words, the impact the injury has had on the plaintiffs
life in terms of pain and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life. While the scenes are
unpleasant, so is plaintiff's injury. Id. at
610. As noted by the Thomas court, liability was not at issue in Grimes and the film
was shown only as an aid in determining
damages.
The case of Foster v. Crawford Shipping
Co., Ltd., 496 F.2d 788 (3rd Cir.1974), is one
in which plaintiff suffered personal injuries
while unloading defendant's ship. The trial
court found the defendant liable and the
only issue on appeal was the amount of
damages. After the injury, the plaintiff
became a severe schizophrenic and was adjudicated an incompetent. At issue was
plaintiff's prognosis for recovery. The trial
court admitted a videotape of a conversation between the plaintiff and his attorney.
The court of appeals held that the trial
court committed reversible error in admitting the tape. Plaintiff contended that the
purpose of the film was merely to illustrate
their expert witnesses's testimony regarding plaintiffs condition. The court found
that even if the film had actually been
utilized in this way, "any benefit which
might have been derived in the factfinding
process by such an illustration was far outweighed by the prejudice of what amounted
to ex parte testimony from the absent incompetent." Id. at 792.
The above cases suggest that the prejudicial effect of a videotape is decided on a
case by case basis. These cases illustrate
the approaches taken by various courts in
deciding the admissibility of a videotape.
These cases which deal with different videotapes and were decided under totally
different circumstances do not, however,
provide an answer for this case. The particular circumstances determine admission
or exclusion. As noted above, decisions on
relevancy of evidence are within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Mason, supra.
This same rule applies to questions of preju-

dice. Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d
1069 (10th Cir.1983). After having reviewed the record we are unable to hold
that the trial judge abused his discretion in
admitting the videotape.
[8] Bradley Durflinger did not appear
as a raving incompetent on the videotape.
The videotape suggested that Bradley was
very much in control of his outward behavior. Indeed, the trial judge commented at
trial: "He appears much more normal on
the tube than you would imagine a guy of
that character. I thought maybe the defendants wanted it for evidentiary purposes." The tape could arguably benefit
either of the parties. It cannot be said to
be unduly prejudicial and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting it.
E. Remarks of Plaintiffs Attorney:
[9] The defendants also argue that the
trial court erred in permitting plaintiffs'
counsel to make certain remarks. According to defendants, counsel's references to
famous killers and questions to witnesses
regarding psychotic behavior were improper. Defendants urge this court to find that
these remarks were irrelevant and prejudicial. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. The standard of review for alleged
improper conduct of counsel is whether the
trial court abused its discretion. Arnold v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186 (4th
Cir.1982), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 103
S.Ct. 1801, 76 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983); Slade v.
Slade, 439 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.1971); Zeigler
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 437 F.2d
80 (5th Cir.1971); Waters v. Western Company of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir.
1971). Moreover, "trial court discretion as
to these matters is broad or—what comes to
the same thing—appellate review is especially deferential." Arnold v. Eastern Air
Lines, supra at 195. In cases containing
remarks comparable to those made here,
appellate courts have found that remarks of
counsel were not prejudicial. See, e.g.,
Zeigler, supra at 81-82 (reference to grade
crossing as a "death trap" during opening
argument in tort action). Indeed, courts
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have upheld as non-prejudicial comments by
counsel that were much stronger than those
made here. Arnold, supra at 196. ("[Eastern must have searched the countryside"
for [opponent's expert witness] and "for 40
bucks an hour, you can probably get almost
anybody to say anything"; "killing people
and maiming people is something they've
gotten immune to as a part of doing business.").
After considering the remarks at issue
here, there is no reason to believe that the
challenged comments were either prejudicial or that the trial court's response to
them was an abuse of discretion. In reaching this decision it is important to note that
this was a long trial. It is unlikely that
these isolated remarks prejudiced the jury
in any way.
II. DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
[10] Defendants contend that the trial
court erred in its instructions to the jury.
Essentially, defendants' argument is that
the trial judge should have used the instructions proposed by appellant. The instructions given to the jury contained substantially the same information as appellants'
proposed versions. While this court may
note that litigants always seek the instruction that is most favorable to their position,
this is not the standard by which to judge
the charge to the jury. "The appellate
standard of review to be applied by the
court is clear: an error in jury instructions
will mandate reversal of a judgment only if
the error is determined to have been prejudicial, based on a review of the record as a
whole." Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d
932, 938 (4th Cir.1983) (citing Connors v.
McNulty, 697 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.1983)). In
addition, the reviewing court is to "consider
all that the jury heard and, from standpoint
of the jury, decide 'not whether the charge
was faultless in every particular but whether the jury was misled in any way and
whether it had understanding of the issues
and its duty to determine these issues.'"
Alloy Ml Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co.,
635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1980) (quoting Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d

1076, 1100 (5th Cir.1973), cert denied, 419
U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107
(1974)). The district court's instructions to
the jury correctly stated the law governing
the case and were fair to all parties. The
instructions do not constitute reversible error.
III. MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT & NEW TRIAL:
The various points raised by the defendants have been treated in some detail and it
has been this court's conclusion that none of
the issues presented disclosed substantial
error. Consequently, although we have
noted and considered the arguments in the
briefs with respect to these matters, inasmuch as the arguments involve a summary
of the questions already considered, we conclude that it is unnecessary to discuss them
in detail again.
The decision of the trial court, 563
F.Supp. 322, should be affirmed.
APPENDIX
No. 55,594
IRVIN L. DURFLINGER,
RAYMOND DURFLINGER, and
RONALD DURFLINGER,
Plaintiffs,
BENJAMIN ARTILES, PRECIOSA
ROSALES
and EDUARDO MEDRANO,
Defendants.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Negligence exists where there is a
duty owed by one person to another and a
breach of that duty occurs. Further, if
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Medical malpractice and wrongful
death action was brought against doctor,
and doctor sought to interview decedent's
other physicians ex parte with respect to
matters relating to the litigation. The Superior Court, Law Division, granted doctor's motion to compel plaintiff to furnish
unrestricted authorizations in order to induce treating physicians to release information concerning decedent. After the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal, the
Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion
for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court,
Stein, J., held that defendant-doctor's counsel had right to attempt to interview decedent's treating physicians ex parte with
respect to matters relating to the litigation.
Affirmed as modified and remanded.
1. Physicians and Surgeons @=>15(9)
Physician has professional obligation
to maintain the confidentiality of his patient's communications.
2. Pretrial Procedure @=>97
Defendant doctor's counsel in medical
malpractice and wrongful death action had
right to attempt to interview decedent's
other treating physicians ex parte with respect to matters relating to the litigation;

refusing to follow Weaver v. Mann, 90
F.R.D. 443; Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61
F.R.D. 22; Wenninger v. Muesing, 307
Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333; Jaap v. District Ct. 8th J. Dist, 623 P.2d 1389; Anker
v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d
582; and Cwick v. Rochester, 54 A.D.2d
1078, 388 N.Y.S.2d 753. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A22.1 to 2A:84A-22.7.
3. Pretrial Procedure ®=>121, 126, 127
Plaintiff's counsel in medical malpractice and wrongful death action should provide written authorization to defendant-doctor to facilitate conduct of ex parte interviews with decedent's other treating physicians, and such authorizations can be compelled by motion if they are withheld unreasonably, but conditions should be imposed
in the authorizations or in orders compelling their issuance that, inter alia, require
defendant's counsel to provide plaintiff's
counsel with reasonable notice of the time
and place of the proposed interviews and to
provide the physician with a description of
the anticipated scope of interview and communicate with unmistakable clarity the fact
that the physician's participation in an ex
parte interview is voluntary. N.J.S.A.
2A:84A-22.1 to 2A:84A-22.7.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered
by
STEIN, J.
The issue in this medical malpractice and
wrongful death action is whether the de-
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fendant's counsel, as an aid to discovery,
has the right to attempt to interview decedent's physicians ex parte with respect to
matters relating to the litigation.
I
The facts material to our resolution of
this question are not disputed. In June,
1983, Larry Stempler, individually and as
general administrator and administrator ad
prosequendum of the Estate of Barbara
Anne Stempler, deceased, brought this action against Dr. E. Allan Speidell and a
number of fictitious defendants. An
amended complaint identified two nurses as
individual defendants.
Decedent consulted Dr. Speidell in August, 1981, complaining of pain, abdominal
distension and constipation. Dr. Speidell
diagnosed a fecal impaction and referred
decedent to the emergency room of St.
Barnabas Medical Center. Decedent was
admitted to the hospital and treatment was
initiated. Dr. Speidell was designated the
attending physician. During the early
morning hours of the day following her
admission, Mrs. Stempler experienced difficulty breathing and failed to respond to
stimuli. She was treated emergently for
cardiac arrest. Dr. Speidell was notified
and Mrs. Stempler was pronounced dead
shortly after his arrival at the hospital that
morning.
In preparing to defend the claims asserted against Dr. Speidell, his counsel ascertained that decedent had received medical
care from a significant number of physicians and health care providers. Dr. Speidell's counsel requested that the plaintiff
sign authorizations in order to induce such
physicians and health care providers to release information concerning decedent to
defendant's counsel. The plaintiff signed
each of the authorizations, but only after
plaintiffs counsel crossed out the portion
of the text reading: "[T]his will further
authorize you to discuss any and all information concerning any treatment by you or
examinations performed by you concerning
the undersigned.'' In its place, plaintiffs

counsel inserted the following statement on
each authorization form: "This does not
authorize you to have any discussions concerning these records, my care or my claim,
but is expressly limited to allowing you to
provide copies or inspection of my records
and x-rays."
On the assumption that the substituted
language on the authorization forms would
preclude direct interviews with the physicians who had treated decedent, defendant
filed a motion with the Law Division to
compel the plaintiff to execute unrestricted
authorization forms. In support of the motion, defendant's counsel submitted an affidavit alleging that Dr. Clara J. Szekely, a
psychiatrist who had treated decedent, advised the defendant's counsel that the restriction inserted in the authorization
would prevent her from communicating
with defendant's counsel concerning decedent. Specifically, the affidavit alleged
that Dr. Szekely believed her records would
be unintelligible without her interpretation,
and she would not provide copies of them.
According to defendant's counsel, Dr.
Szekely was willing to furnish a written
interpretation detailing her records, but
only if plaintiff authorized her to do so.
Plaintiff resisted the motion to compel
unrestricted authorizations since they
would permit defendant's counsel to interview personally decedent's treating physicians, a procedure that allegedly is not
authorized by our Court Rules. Although
plaintiff authorized treating physicians to
provide access to decedent's medical
records, plaintiff contends that depositions
are the only appropriate means by which
the physicians may furnish additional relevant, unprivileged information to defendant's counsel without creating an undue
risk of disclosing confidential information
not related to the litigation.
The Law Division judge granted the defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to furnish unrestricted authorizations. After the
Appellate Division denied leave to appeal,
this Court granted plaintiffs motion for
leave to appeal. R. 2:2-2(b).
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Although the right claimed by defendant's counsel to conduct personal interviews with decedent's physicians is cast in
a nontestimonial discovery context, plaintiffs objections to the interviews have their
roots in the testimonial patient-physician
privilege. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.1 to -22.7. >
Plaintiff concedes that instituting suit extinguishes the privilege to the extent that
decedent's medical condition will be a
factor in the litigation. NJ.S.A. 2A:84A22.4.2 However, as to those elements of
decedent's prior medical history that are
not relevant to the litigation, plaintiff asserts the continued viability of the privilege, contending that unsupervised ex
parte interviews with decedent's treating
physicians do not afford as complete protection against disclosure of privileged material as would be provided by. depositions
upon oral examination. See R. 4:14.
Because such interviews would take
place in a nontestimonial context, no statute or Court Rute express}}7 precludes detense counsel from interviewing decedent's
treating physicians regarding confidential
communications. Moreover, even if the
testimonial privilege could be imputed to
such interviews, no statute or rule expressly precludes ex parte interviews concerning
unprivileged communications, and the initiation of suit abrogates the privilege as to
medical conditions pertinent to the litigation. However, as was the case with dece1. NJ.S.A. 2A.-84A-22.2 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a
person, whether or not a party, has a privilege
in a civil action or in a prosecution for a
crime or violation of the disorderly persons
law or for an act of juvenile delinquency to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness
from disclosing, a communication, if he
claims the privilege and the judge finds that
(a) the communication was a confidential
communication between patient and physician, and (b) the patient or the physician
reasonably believed the communication to be
necessary or helpful to enable the physician
to make a diagnosis of the condition of the
patient or to prescribe or render treatment
therefor, and (c) the witness (i) is the holder
of the privilege or (ii) at the time of the
communication was the physician or a person
to whom disclosure was made because reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
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dent's psychiatrist, treating physicians are
not likely to cooperate with defense counsel
in the absence of authorization from the
patient. Accordingly, defense counsel in
this case sought to compel plaintiff to furnish written authorization for interviews
with decedent's treating physicians. The
issue before us is whether plaintiff should
be compelled to authorize such ex parte
communication between defense counsel
and decedent's physicians, as an aid to defendant's discovery, and if so, under what
protective conditions. A resolution of this
issue requires us to weigh the interests
protected by the patient-physician privilege
and the physician's professional obligation
of confidentiality against the interests advanced by permitting defense counsel to
conduct ex parte interviews with decedent's physicians regarding those conditions pertinent to the claims asserted in the
litigation.
II
The patient-physician privilege was not
recognized at common law in New Jersey,
Hague v. Williams, 37 NJ. 328, 334-35,
181 A 2d 345 (1962), nor was it recognized
under the common law in other jurisdictions. State v. Dyal, 97 NJ 229, 235, 478
A 2d 390 (1984); McCormick's Handbook
of the Law of Evidence, § 98 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter McCormick ]; 8 J. Wigmore,
communication or for the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was transmitted or
(iii) is any other person who obtained knowledge or possession of the communication as
the result of an intentional breach of the
physician's duty of nondisclosure* by the physician or his agent or servant and (d) the
claimant is the holder of the privilege or a
person authorized to claim the privilege for
him.
2. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.4 provides:
There is no privilege under this act in an
action in which the condition of the patient is
an element or factor of the claim or defense
of the patient or of any partv claiming
through or under the patient or claiming as a
beneficiary of the patient through a contract
to which the patient is or was a party or
under which the patient is or was insured.
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Evidence, § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Moreover, the original New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of
the Law of Evidence expressly rejected the
adoption of the patient-physician privilege,
State v. Dyal, supra, 97 NJ. at 235-36,
478 A 2d 390, citing Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evi-'
deuce to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, R. 27, drafter's comment, at 71-72, and
it has never been adopted as a Rule of
Evidence by this Court. State v. Dyal,
supra, 97 NJ. at 235-36, 478 A 2d 390;
State v. Soney, 177 NJSuper. 47, 57, 424
A 2d 1182 (App.Div.1980), certif. den., 87
NJ. 313, 434 A 2d 67 (1981). Thus, in New
Jersey the privilege is of relatively recent
statutory origin. L.1968, c. 185 (codified at
NJ.S.A. 2A:84A-22.1 to -22.7).
The testimonial privilege is justified because it encourages candid communication
between patient and doctor without fear of
unauthorized disclosures. McCormick, supra, § 98 at 213; see J. Wigmore, supra,
§ 2380a, at 828-29.
It has been said that the purpose of
the patient-physician .privilege is to enable the patient to secure medical services without fear of betrayal and the unwarranted embarrassing and detrimental
disclosure in court of information which
might deter the patient from revealing
his symptoms to the doctor to the detriment of his health. See Branch v. Wilkinson, 198 Neb. 649, 256 NW.2d 307,
312 (Sup.Ct.1977); State v. Staat, 291
Minn. 394, 192 N. W.2d 192, 195 (Sup.Ct.
1971). [State in Interest of M.P.C., 165
NJSuper. 131, 136, 397 A 2d 1092 (App.
Div.1979).]
Critics of the privilege maintain that the
vast majority of communications between
patient and physician are not intended to be
strictly confidential, and as to those that
are, they argue that the absence of privilege would not deter patients from frank
communication with their physicians because them primary concern is to secure
proper medical attention. J. Wigmore, su-

pra, § 2380a, at 829-30; McCormick, supra, § 105, at 225.
This Court previously has articulated the
major factors that argue against a broad
application of the patient-physician privilege:
The inevitable effect of allowing the
privilege * * * is the withholding of evidence, often of the most reliable and
probative kind, from the trier of fact. To
the extent that the privilege is honored,
it may therefore undermine the search
for truth in the administration of justice.
McCormick, supra, § 105, a+ 226; 8
Wigmore, supra, § 2380a, at 830. Because the privilege precludes the admission of relevant evidence, it is restrictively construed. State v. Soney, supra, 111
NJSuper. at 58[424 A2d 1182]; State
in the Interest ofM.RC, 165 NJ.Super.
131, 136 [397 A2d 1092] (App.Div.1979).
Indeed, distinguished scholars have asserted that the privilege cannot be justified. See, e.g., Chaffee, "Is Justice
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?," 52
Yale LJ. 607 (1943); 8 Wigmore, supra,
§ 2380a, at 832. [State v. Dyal, supra,
97 NJ. at 237-38, 478 A 2d 390.]
[1] Notwithstanding the concern that
application of the patient-physician privilege may bar the admissibility of probative
testimony, there is a clear recognition that,
in general, a physician does have a professional obligation to maintain the confidentiality of his patient's communications.
See American Medical Assfn, Principles
of Medical Ethics, § 9 (1957). This obligation to preserve confidentiality is recognized as part of the Hippocratic Oath. As
this Court observed in Hague v. Williams,
supra:
The benefits which inure to the relationship of physician-patient from the denial
to a physician of any right to promiscuously disclose such information are selfevident. On the other hand, it is impossible to conceive of any countervailing benefits which would arise by according a
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physician the right to gossip about a
patient's health.
A patient should be entitled to freely
disclose his symptoms and condition to
his doctor in order to receive proper
treatment without fear that those facts
may become public property. Only thus
can the purpose of the relationship be
fulfilled. [37 NJ. at 335-36, 181 A 2d
345.]
Accordingly, courts in other jurisdictions
have held that the unauthorized extra-judicial disclosure by a physician of confidential information from a patient may be actionable. Hammonds v. Aetna Cos. &
Surety Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, den'g reconsideration of 237 F.Supp. 96, 101-102 (N.D.
Ohio 1965); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
287 5o.2d 824 (1973); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 iV.JF.2d 333 (1976)
(dictum); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb.
224, 177 N W. 831 (1920); Clark v. Geraci,
29 Misc.2d 791, 208 Af.KS.2d 564 (Sup.Ct.
1960); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc.2d 441,
273 NY.S.2d 288 (Sup.Ct. 1966); Berry v.
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814
(1958); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441,
162 P. 572 (1917) (dictum); see Note, "Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature
of the Physician Patient Relationship/' 52
Colum.L.Rev. 383, 397-98 (1952) (questioning the utility of recognizing an action for
physician's wrongful disclosure other than
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding);
Note, "Medical Practice and the Right to
Privacy," 43 Minn.L.Rev. 943 (1959); Note,
"Roe v. Doe: A Remedy for Disclosure of
Psychiatric Confidences," 29 Rutgers
L.Rev. 190, 192-93 (1975).
Contra
Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389
S.W.2d 249 (1965); cf. Collins v. Howard,
156 F.Supp. 322 (S.D.Ga.1957) (complaint
alleging wrongful disclosure of test results
dismissed; no confidential relationship between physician and patient recognized in
Georgia; however, even if there were,
•mere taking of blood sample does not establish patient-physician relationship).
In Hague v. Williams, supra, 37 N.J.
328, 181 A2d 345, a case decided prior to
the enactment of the testimonial privilege,
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plaintiffs' infant daughter died ei^ht
months after birth because of a congenital
heart defect. When plaintiffs filed a claim
under a life insurance contract naming ih(>
infant as insured and the father as benefj
ciary, the life insurance company inter
viewed defendant pediatrician who advi*«M|
the insurer that the infant had had heart
trouble since birth. Plaintiffs sought dam
ages for the allegedly unlawful disclosure
of this information by defendant, contending that he had never advised them of the
congenital heart defect and that defendant
had no right to disclose such information to
the insurer without express authorization.
Id. at 329-32, 181 A2d 345.
Although this Court recognized that such
a cause of action might be sustained in a
proper case, it affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the counts of the complaint
that sought damages for the unauthorized
disclosure, concluding that the patient's
right of confidentiality was not absolute
but qualified:
This is not to say that the patient
enjoys an absolute right, but rather that
he possesses a limited right against such
disclosure, subject to exceptions prompted by the supervening interest of society.
We conclude, therefore, that ordinarily a
physician receives information relating to
a patient's health in a confidential capacity and should not disclose such information without the patient's consent, except
where the public interest or the private
interest of the patient so demands.
Without delineating the precise outer
contours of the exceptions, it may gen,.r
ally be said that disclosure may, under
such compelling circumstances, be made
to a person with a legitimate interest ,n
the patient's health. [Id. at 33C, lxi A j<|
345.]
This judicial recognition that a phyHnan
could be held liable for a breach ol the
obligation of confidentiality adds weight | n
the argument that unsupervised interviews
by defense counsel may not adequately
protect the physician's interest in avoiding
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inadvertent disclosures that could be actionable. Thus, it is asserted that the physician's interest can be guarded only by
requiring defendant's counsel to use depositions rather than informal interviews to
obtain unprivileged information from plaintiffs physicians.
Defendant, however, argues that requiring the formality of depositions would impose unnecessarily cumbersome restrictions on his right to prepare for trial. He
contends that an informal interview is the
most appropriate way to ascertain whether
any of plaintiff's physicians possess unprivileged information relevant to the defense
of the litigation, arguing that in this context depositions are impractical, inefficient,
and costly. Defendant maintains that it is
unfair to restrict his counsel's access to
potential witnesses when no comparable restriction is imposed upon plaintiff.
Ill
Courts in our own state and throughout
the country are sharply divided on the
question. A number of courts in other
jurisdictions have held that defendant's
counsel should not be allowed to interview
plaintiffs treating physicians ex parte but
should be restricted to depositions. Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443 (D.N.D.1981)
(personal interviews not contemplated by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.
Civ.P.) and could lead to discouraging plaintiff's physicians from testifying); Garner v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22 (D.Alaska
1973) (no specific authorization of interviews
contained in Fed.R.Civ.P.); Wenninger v.
Muesing, supra, 307 Minn. 405, 240
N. W.2d 333 (depositions guard against unauthorized disclosure of information that is
privileged or irrelevant and presence of
patient's attorney protects physician from
unwitting disclosure of confidential information); Jaap v. District Ct. 8th J. Dist,
623 P.2d 1389 (Mont.1981) (Montana Rules
do not authorize personal interviews);
Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.2d 148, 413
iV.KS.2d 582 (Sup.Ct.), affd mem., 73
A.D.2d 589, 422 \.Y.S.2d 887 (App.Div.

1979) (New York Rules do not authorize
interviews; difficult for physician to determine the extent to which patient's privilege
has been waived because issue of legal
relevancy is complex; therefore, rule requiring formal discovery will lessen number of suits against doctors for wrongful
disclosure); Cwiek v. Rochester, 54 A.D. 2d
1078, 388 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup.Ct.1976); cf.
Alexander v. Knight. 197 Pa.Super. 79,
177 A2d 142 (Super.Ct.1962) (doctor owes
patient a duty to refuse affirmative assistance to patient's adversary in litigation).
Those courts in other jurisdictions that
have upheld the right of defendant's counsel to conduct informal interviews of plaintiffs treating physicians have done so because court rules do not prohibit such interviews and those interviews constitute a
more efficient and less expensive method
of trial preparation. Doe v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); TransWorld Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d
1148 (Alaska 1976); see also Gailitis v.
Bassett, 5 Mich.App. 382, 146 N.W.2d 708
(Ct.App.1966) (no reason given for allowing
interview of plaintiff's physician); Arctic
Motor Freight Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d
1006 (Alaska 1977) (citing Trans-World Investments v. Drobny, supra).
Several of our unreported lower court
decisions adhere to the rule that restricts
defendant's counsel to deposition of plaintiffs physicians. Another unreported lower court decision, however, permits ex
parte interviews of plaintiffs physicians,
and compels the plaintiff's execution of unrestricted authorizations.
A recent opinion by our Appellate Division upheld defendant's right to interview
ex parte plaintiff's treating physicians. In
Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J.Super. 444,
480 A2d 223 (App.Div.1984), defendants in
a medical malpractice action appealed from
an order of the trial court barring two of
plaintiffs treating physicians, one of whom
had been interviewed by defendant's counsel, from testifying on defendants' behalf
as either fact or expert witnesses. The
plaintiff had been treated for an upper
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respiratory infection by defendants, Manrodt and Brown, who prescribed a penicillin
derivative known as amoxicillin. Subsequently she came under the care of Drs.
Galton and Needle. Plaintiff developed
vasculitis, a severe systemic disease resulting in permanently debilitating injuries,
which she contended was a reaction to improperly prescribed amoxicillin. Id. at 44748, 480 A 2d 223.
Defendants moved to compel plaintiff to
furnish authorizations for interviews with
Drs. Galton, Needle, and other treating
physicians, but the trial court denied the
motion without a clear explanation for its
ruling. It did not, however, foreclose the
possibility of granting the motion at a future time. The doctors had not been asked
to speak to defense counsel but apparently
were willing to do so. Defense counsel
arranged a meeting with Dr. Galton and
advised plaintiffs counsel by letter that he
should move for a protective order if he
objected to the meeting. Plaintiff did not
move for a protective order but reserved
the right to object at trial to the admission
of any evidence generated by the interview
with Dr. Galton. The meeting with Dr.
Galton took place and both Dr. Galton and
Dr. Needle later furnished written reports
expressing doubt that amoxicillin was the
cause of plaintiffs condition. The trial
court excluded their testimony. Id. at 44850, 480 A2d 223.
In reversing, Judge Botter noted that
neither the Court Rules nor the Rules of
Evidence prohibit informal interviews by
defense counsel for the purpose of obtaining unprivileged information from a potential witness. The Appellate Division observed that it would be unfair to bar the
testimony of Drs. Galton and Needle since
defendant had attempted to obtain a ruling
on the issue and plaintiff had failed to
move for a protective order. Id. at 450,
480 A 2d 223. In recognizing the right of
defense counsel to conduct personal interviews with plaintiffs treating physicians,
the court reasoned:

N.J. 863

The policy of law is to allow all competent, relevant evidence to be produced,
subject only to a limited number of privileges. Sir Emd.R. 7. As stated in Hague v. Wilhants, 37 N.J. at 335 [181 A2d
345], "society has a right to testimony
and ... all privileges of exemption from
this duty are exceptional." We do a disservice to these principles by creating
restrictions <)n the right of parties to talk
to potential witnesses. The weighing of
policy has been done by the Legislature
in the definition of privileges and the
terms on which they are lost or surrendered. To speculate about sinister motives of attorneys and treating doctors
and to establish additional limitations on
the right to seek out evidence as a matter of policy would do mischief to the
adversary Hystem. It would be a mistake to say that all testimony of a treating doctor m so tainted because he conversed with his patient's adversary that
his testimony must be excluded. Such a
rule would inevitably impede the search
for truth. Nor can we say that the justice system should pay this price so that
the doctor-patient relationship will not be
bruised. Defendants ought to have the
same right of access as plaintiffs have to
potential witnesses, even if they are
treating physicians. [Id. at 456, 480 A 2d
223.]
IV
In resolving this issue, our objective is to
accord adequate recognition to the competing interests that have been identified. Although this litigation involves claims for
wrongful death and medical malpractice,
the same interests would be present in
other types of personal injury litigation.
The defendant's expressed concern is for
the right to interview decedent's treating
physicians, rather than be restricted to the
formality, expense, and inconvenience of
depositions conducted pursuant to the
Court Rules An unexpressed interest, we
assume, is the hope that one or more of
these physicians might provide evidence or
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testimony that would be helpful to the defendant at trial. Unquestionably, defendant's counsel would prefer to seek out such
evidence or discuss the prospect of such
testimony in an ex parte interview rather
than during a deposition attended by plaintiff's counsel.
The plaintiffs interest is twofold. The
interest advanced as primary is the desire
to protect from disclosure by the physician
confidential information not relevant to the
litigation and therefore still protected by
the patient-physician privilege and the physician's professional obligation to preserve
confidentiality. An equally if not more important interest of the plaintiff, although
not specifically pressed before us, is the
desire to preserve the physician's loyalty to
the plaintiff in the hope that the physician
will not voluntarily provide evidence or testimony that will assist the defendant's
cause. See Alexander v. Knight, supra,
197 Pa.Super. at 79, 177 A 2d at 146 (Members of the medical profession "owe their
patients more than just medical care for
which payment is exacted; there is a duty
of total care; that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in litigation,
to render reports when necessary and to
attend court when needed. That further
includes a duty to refuse affirmative assistance to the patient's antagonist in litigation."); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 243 F.Supp. at 799 (quoting
Alexander v. Knight, supra, with approval). Contra Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra,
99 F.R.D. at 128 ("As a general proposition
* * * no party to litigation has anything
resembling a proprietary right to any witness's evidence. Absent a privilege no party is entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness, however partial or important to him, by insisting upon some notion
of allegiance.").
The physician's interest focuses on prevention of inadvertent disclosure of information still protected by the privilege, since
an unauthorized disclosure of such information may be unethical and actionable.
Collaterally, the physician needs to be in-

formed that he need not cooperate if he
believes that would compromise his professional responsibilities.
[2,3] In our view, these competing interests can be respected adequately without requiring the formality of depositions
in every case. The Rules regulating pretrial discovery do not purport to set forth
the only methods by which information pertinent to the litigation may be obtained.
Personal interviews, although not expressly referred to in our Rules, are an accepted,
informal method of assembling facts and
documents in preparation for trial. Their
use should be encouraged as should other
informal means of discovery that reduce
the cost and time of trial preparation.
Since it is unrealistic to anticipate that
decedent's physicians will participate in
such interviews without plaintiff's consent,
plaintiff's counsel should provide written
authorization to facilitate the conduct of
interviews. If such authorizations are
withheld unreasonably, their production
can be compelled, as in this case, by motion. However, conditions should be imposed in the authorizations, or in orders
compelling their issuance, that require defendant's counsel to provide plaintiff's
counsel with reasonable notice of the time
and place of the proposed interviews. Additionally, the authorizations or orders
should require that defendant's counsel
provide the physician with a description of
the anticipated scope of the interview, and
communicate with unmistakable clarity the
fact that the physician's participation in an
ex parte interview is voluntary. This procedure will afford plaintiff's counsel the
opportunity to communicate with the physician, if necessary, in order to express any
appropriate concerns as to the proper scope
of the interview, and the extent to which
plaintiff continues to assert the patientphysician privilege with respect to that
physician.
Plaintiff may also seek and obtain a protective order if under the circumstances a
proposed ex parte interview with a specific
physician threatens to cause such substan-
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tial prejudice to plaintiff as to warrant the
supervision of the trial court. Such supervision could take the form of an order
requiring the presence of plaintiffs counsel
during the interview or, in extreme cases,
requiring defendant's counsel to proceed
by deposition. We are satisfied that the
flexibility afforded by our decision will permit trial courts and counsel to fashion appropriate procedures in unusual cases without interfering unnecessarily with the use
of personal interviews in routine cases.
Notwithstanding this resolution, we
deem the issue raised to be of sufficient
complexity as to merit the prompt attention
of the Civil Practice Committee, whose recommendation we will solicit with regard to
the necessity for amending the Court Rules
to deal with this issue more formally.
Accordingly, the order of the Law Division, as modified, is affirmed and the matter is remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
For modification and affirmance—Chief
Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI and STEIN—7.
Opposed—None.
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or Court, Appellate Division reinstating an
arbitrator's award of suspension of an employee following finding of misconduct.
The Supreme Court, Clifford, J., held that:
(1) arbitrator exceeded his authority in imposing the suspension, rather than termination, after he found employee misconduct, by "reading into" contract a requirement for progressive discipline, and (2) employer did not lose its right to terminate
employee by waiting three weeks after alleged incident to impose discipline, during
which time it investigated charges and allowed employee response.
Reversed.
Wilentz, C.J., dissented and filed opinion in which Stein, J., joined.

1. Arbitration <£=>1.2, 73.7(1)
Arbitration is a device viewed favorably by the courts and, towards that end,
judicial interference with role of arbitrator
is to be strictly limited; arbitrator's award
is not to be cast aside lightly.
2. Labor Relations ®=>483
Scope of review of arbitrator's determination of contractual language in public
employee contract is whether arbitration
determination was reasonably debatable.
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100 N.J. 383

COUNTY COLLEGE OF MORRIS
STAFF ASSOCIATION and
Victor Muller, Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
COUNTY COLLEGE OF MORRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued March 4, 1985.
Decided Aug. 5, 1985.
Petition for certification was made
from an unreported decision of the Superi-

3. Arbitration <®=76U)
An arbitrator's award is subject to being vacated when it has been shown that a
statutory basis justifies such action. N.J.
S.A. 2A:24-8.
4. Arbitration @=>29.1
Labor Relations <3=>462
When parties have agreed, through a
contract, on a defined set of rules that are
to govern the arbitration process, arbitrator exceeds his powers when he ignores
limited authority that contract confers;
when an arbitration award does not draw
its essence from the bargaining agreement,
it will not be enforced by the courts. N.J.
S.A. 2A:24-8.
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the advertisements of the object.7 The advertisement was thus not introduced to
prove that the statements of the manufacturer were true (which could be characterized as hearsay), rather, the advertisements
were properly introduced to prove the
"state of mind" of the community (which is
not hearsay) Cf. Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra (the defendant used an advertisement from a sporting good magazine to
support his defense that a "Wyoming
Knife" had a common lawful purpose as a
hunting tool).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find appellant's claims are all without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
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Pearlena MOSES, Appellant,
v.
Daniel T. McWILLIAMS, Esq., Marvin
Krane, M.D., and Albert Einstein Medical
Center.
Pearlena MOSES, Appellant,
v.
UNDERWRITERS
ADJUSTING COMPANY.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 16, 1987.
Filed Sept. 28, 1988.
Patient brought suit against her physician alleging breach of confidentiality by
doctor's ex parte pretrial discussions with
medical malpractice defendant's attorney
and his testimony at medical malpractice
trial. The Court of Common Pleas, Phila7. Though an advertisement may properly be admitted as evidence tending to establish indirectly the common purpose of an object, we in no
way suggest that such evidence is conclusive as

delaphia County, Nos. 4356 February
Term, 1983 and 3167 September Term,
Prattis, J., dismissed the complaints. On
appeal, the Superior Court, Nos. 2062 and
2063 Philadelphia 1985, Montemuro, J.,
held that: (1) patient could not assert cause
of action for breach of confidentiality by
physician as patient raised the issue by
bringing a personal injury action; (2) patient's right to confidentiality is less than
absolute; (3) neither constitutional nor
common-law right to privacy in one's medical records is absolute; (4) patient waived
physician/patient privilege when she instituted civil action for personal injuries; (5)
doctor's pretrial statements and testimony
were absolutely privileged from all civil
liability; (6) absolute privilege for witnesses extends to pretrial ex parte communications as well as to testimony; (7) doctor
who gave out unrelated information could
be liable for breach of confidentiality; (8)
claim for inducement of breach failed; and
(9) absolute privilege protected doctor from
defamation liability.
Affirmed.
Cirillo, President Judge, filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Olszewski and Tamilia, JJ., joined.
Del Sole, J., filed a concurring opinion.
1. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»15(9)
Given patient's qualified right to privacy in her medical records and reduced expectation of privacy as result of filing a
civil suit for personal injuries, in conjunction with policy supporting physician-patient privilege and the absolute immunity
from civil liability granted witnesses in judicial proceedings, patient could not assert
cause of action for breach of confidentiality
by physician who met with insurance representatives and attorney of defendant in
medical malpractice action and related relevant information about patient's physical
condition and further testified about the
patient's condition at trial.
to the object's common purpose. Indeed, one of
the purposes of advertisement is to change the
public perception of a product.
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2. Physicians and Surgeons e=»15(9)
10, Libel and Slander e»38(l)
Absolute immunity for witnesses in
Patient's right to confidentiality from
physician is less than absolute. 18 P&XLS. regular course of civil proceedings extends
A. § 5106; 53 P.S. § 24663; 11 P.S. § 2204; to pretrial ex parte communications.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909.
11. Libel and Slander ®=>Wh
< >
Although a doctor who grants a pri3. Physicians and Surgeons s= 15(9)
vate
interview in connection with judicial
In order for doctor's disclosure to be
proceedings
would enjoy judicial privilege
actionable at law, disclosure must be made
protecting
him
from liability for defwithout legal justification or excuse. 18
amation,
he
could
lose that privilege by
Pa.C.S.A. § 5106; 53 P.S. § 24663; 11 P.S.
disclosing
information
that has no relation
§ 2204; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909.
to the underlying action.
4. Constitutional Law e=>82(7)
12. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>15(9)
Patient's constitutional right to privacy
If a doctor makes statement clearly
about his medical records is qualified when
unrelated
to a lawsuit during private interthat individual has filed suit for personal
view
regarding
litigation, there might be a
injuries.
cause of action for breach of confidentiality
by the patient.
5. Torts <3=>8.5(2)
Individual's right to privacy in his
medical records is qualified when he has
filed suit for personal injuries.
6. Witnesses <3=>219(5)
Patients waive the physician/patient
privilege when they instigate civil actions
for personal injuries. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929.
7. Physicians and Surgeons <s»15(9)
No cause of action arises from a doctor's violation of the physician/patient privilege under the medical licensing statute.
63 P.S. §§ 422.41, 422.41(8).
8. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>15(9)
Doctor's pretrial statements made to
attorney of medical malpractice defendant
and his testimony in medical malpractice
action were absolutely privileged from all
civil liability because they were made in
regular course of judicial proceedings.
9. Physicians and Surgeons ^ l S O )
Absolute privilege barred patient's
claim for doctor's breach of confidentiality
claim against doctor following doctor's testimony in personal injury suit instigated by
patient because patient had reduced expectation of privacy upon instigation of the
suit and doctor witness had performed
same function as any other witness, aiding
the fact finder in its truth-finding function.

13. Torts <3=>26(1)
Upon plaintiffs failure to state cause
of action for breach of confidentiality, her
claims for inducement of that breach also
failed.
14. Libel and Slander e=>38(4)
Absolute privilege protected doctor
from defamation suit by patient for doctor's testimony during medical malpractice
trial.
15. Libel and Slander <S=>38(1)
Absolute privilege protected doctor
from defamation suit by patient for doctor's ex parte pretrial conference with
agents of defendants during medical malpractice action which was instituted by patient against another doctor.
16. Libel and Slander <s=>84, 85
Plaintiff's failure to allege which statements made by defendant were defamatory, or demonstrate that any such communications were made to unprivileged other persons precluded defendant's defamation liability for those statements.
17. Libel and Slander <3=>84, 85
Complaint for defamation must, on its
face, identify specifically what alleged defamatory statements were made and to
whom they were made.
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William Marvin, Philadelphia, for appellant.
H. Robert Fiebach, Philadelphia, for
McWilliams, appellee.
Howard M. Cyr, III, Philadelphia, for
Krane, appellee.
S. David Fineman, Philadelphia, for Albert Einstein Medical Center, appellee.
Before CIRILLO, President Judge,
and BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI, DEL
SOLE, MONTEMURO, TAMILIA,
KELLY, POPOVICH and JOHNSON,
JJ.
MONTEMURO, Judge:
This is a consolidated appeal from four
orders issued by the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas dismissing the
complaints of appellant Pearlena Moses in
two separate actions in trespass, one
against appellee Underwriters' Adjusting
Company (Underwriters), the other against
appellees Albert Einstein Medical Center
(Albert Einstein), Dr. Marvin Krane, and
Daniel T. McWilliams, Esq.1 Both cases
arose from a medical malpractice action
filed by appellant following a hysterectomy
she underwent in the summer of 1977.
In July of 1977, appellant was admitted
to the emergency room at Albert Einstein.
There, an intern diagnosed her as suffering
from pelvic inflammatory disease. She
was released with instructions to take a
prescription for antibiotics. Her condition
worsened, necessitating her admission to
another hospital where she came under the
care of appellee Dr. Marvin Krane. On
July 7, 1977, he performed a total hysterectomy on her and continued to treat her
until he released her to the care of her
private physician in November 1977. Appellant then brought suit against Albert
Einstein Medical Center, alleging that the
1. This consolidated appeal was originally heard
by a three-judge panel of this Court. That panel
determined that because the case involved issues both of first impression and of great societal importance, it should be certified for en
banc review.
2. Because we here review an order granting a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, we ac-

care she received there had been negligent
and had necessitated the hysterectomy.
In the consolidated actions now before
us, appellant alleges2 that, in the malpractice action, Albert Einstein hired Underwriters to manage its defense of the case.
Underwriters, in turn, retained appellee
Daniel T. McWilliams to represent Albert
Einstein. Underwriters wrote to Dr.
Krane and asked that he contact its representatives to discuss appellant's medical
condition. Neither appellant nor her attorney were notified of this request. Dr.
Krane complied with the request and, in
conversations with both an Underwriters
employee and with McWilliams, revealed
information that he had gained in the
course of his treatment of appellant.
Appellant claims that she first became
aware of Dr. Krane's involvement in the
case when her attorney was notified by Mr.
McWilliams that he intended to call Dr.
Krane as an expert witness at trial. Appellant's counsel informed Dr. Krane at that
time that his communications with Mr.
McWilliams were unauthorized and should
cease immediately. Despite this injunction,
Dr. Krane continued to meet with defense
counsel, allowed McWilliams to review and
copy portions of appellant's patient file,
and testified at trial as a fact witness.3
Appellant contends that as her treating
physician Dr. Krane had a duty to refrain
both from taking any actions which would
be adverse to her interests in the malpractice litigation and from making any disclosures to other parties of information
gained in the course of his treatment of
her, unless authorized to do so either by
her or by law. She also alleges that Dr.
Krane had knowledge of or should have
known of the provisions of the Interprofessional Code, the American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics, and the
cept as true all of appellant's well-pleaded averments of fact. See Capanna v. Travelers Insurance Co., 355 Pa.Super. 219, 513 A.2d 397
(1986).
3. The Honorable Stanley M. Greenberg of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ruled that
Dr. Krane could not testify as an expert witness,
but might do so as a fact witness.
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Hippocratic Oath, all of which provide for should not be accorded the absolute privithe maintenance of confidentiality between lege defense where the patient's confidenphysician and patient. Appellant argues tiality rights have been breached. We afthat because Dr. Krane ignored these pro- firm the trial court's orders.
visions, and breached the confidence gained
[1] We first consider appellant's claim
in treating her, he should be liable in tort
for breach of confidentiality and do so in
for breach of the physician/patient privilight of the standard applicable for review
lege. She further asserts that Albert Einof a judgment on the pleadings:5 We acstein, McWilliams and Underwriters should
be liable for inducing that breach. Accord- cept as true all well-pleaded averments of
ingly, our initial inquiry on appeal, a ques- fact and will uphold the trial court's decition of first impression, is whether a treat- sion only "in cases which are so free from
ing physician's unauthorized and judicially doubt that trial would clearly be a fruitless
unsupervised communications with his pa- exercise." Capanna v. Travelers Insurtient's adversary in a medical malpractice ance Co., 355 Pa.Super. 219, 226, 513 A.2d
action are actionable as a breach of physi- 397, 401 (1986). We find that within the
cian/patient confidentiality. Appellant ar- narrow factual context of this case, appelgues, first, that a general cause of action lant has failed to state a cause of action for
for breach of the physician/patient confi- breach of confidentiality. To find otherdentiality should exist; second, that a phy- wise would undermine several well-estabsician's judicially unsupervised and unau- lished principles of this Commonwealth.
thorized communications with a patient's We must keep in mind that when Dr.
adversaries in litigation should give rise to Krane made his disclosures, appellant had
that cause of action; and, third, that in voluntarily instituted a medical malpractice
such a context the defense of absolute priv- action against Albert Einstein and had
ilege should not be available to the physi- thereby placed in issue her medical condician.4 Appellant's last two questions tion. Given a patient's qualified right to
presented concern her claim for defamation privacy in his or her medical records and an
and are intertwined with the physician/pa- individual's reduced expectation of privacy
tient confidentiality theory. She argues as a result of filing a civil suit for personal
that the trial court erred in granting sum- injuries in conjunction with policies supmary judgment before depositions were porting both the physician/patient privilege
concluded, and also that the appellees statute 6 and the absolute immunity from
4. We need not concern ourselves with appellant's first argument that a general cause of
action for breach of the physician/patient confidentiality should exist. The issue, as framed, is
too broad. We need only to focus on the narrow factual context of this case. We note, however, that a majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the broad issue of whether to recognize a general cause of action for a physician's
breach of confidentiality have allowed such a
claim. However, our research has revealed no
court from any jurisdiction that has allowed
recovery against a physician for breach of confidentiality under facts similar to those alleged in
this case. See, e.g., Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J.
328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Fedell v. Wierzbieniec,
M.D., 127 Misc.2d 124, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1985).
When the cause of action has been recognized,
it is in cases where there have been extra-judicial disclosures of confidential information or
in cases, such as those involving custody, where
the plaintiffs physical condition has not been in
issue. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
287 So.2d 824 (1974) (physician disclosed confidential information to plaintiffs employer);

MacDonald v. dinger, M.D., 84 A.D.2d 482, 446
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (psychiatrist revealed confidential information to plaintiffs wife); Doe v.
Roe, 93 Misc.2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977)
(psychiatrist, without plaintiffs consent, published a book containing verbatim accounts of
plaintiffs feelings); Schafjer v. Spicer, 88 S.D.
36, 215 N.W.2d 134 (1974) (in a custody case,
psychiatrist gave to the attorney of the patient's
ex-husband an affidavit containing information
with regard to his patient's mental health, which
was deemed inadmissible at hearing); Berry v.
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958)
(doctor revealed information about plaintiff to
another doctor for the purpose of conveying the
information to the parents of a woman contemplating marriage to plaintiff).
5. As to the claim for breach of confidentiality
against Dr. Krane, the trial court granted a
judgment on the pleadings, not summary judgment. See Trial Court Opinion at 3, 5.
6. 42 Pa.CS. § 5929.
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civil liability granted to witnesses in judicial proceedings, we will not recognize the
cause of action for breach of confidentiality
as pled in this case.1
Appellant argues that a physician's duty
to maintain confidentiality outside of formal court proceedings is based upon the
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship, the constitutional right of privacy, and the ethical principles of the medical
profession.
[2,3] We first note that a patient's
right to confidentiality is less than absolute. In order for a disclosure to be actionable at law, the disclosure must be made
without legal justification or excuse. The
law is replete with statutory justifications
for disclosure that are deemed to outweigh
the patient's right to confidentiality. For
example, a physician has a duty to report
otherwise confidential information relating
to wounds or injuries inflicted by deadly
weapons (18 Pa.C.S.S. § 5106), contagion
(53 Pa.S.A. § 24663), child abuse (11 Pa.S.
A. § 2204), and medical history in cases of
adoption (23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909). While the
existence of reporting requirements is not
controlling on the issue before us, it indicates the appropriateness of balancing the
competing interests at stake when we evaluate the scope of the physician-patient privilege and the physician's duty of non-disclosure.
[4] In In Re June 1979 Allegheny
County Investigating Grand Jury, 490
7. Our tort law has evolved such that every alleged wrong or injury does not have a legal
remedy. Cf. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The
Law of Torts § 1 (5th ed. 1984) ("[t]here are
many interferences with the plaintiffs interests,
including negligently causing mere mental suffering without physical consequences .... for
which the law will give no remedy ..."). Before we grant relief to a plaintiff, we must
reflect upon the principles and policies of this
Commonwealth that will be affected by creating
a new cause of action. We do not find that this
case warrants establishing a new cause of action. If Dr. Krane has behaved unethically, the
medical profession can discipline him as would
the legal profession reprimand a lawyer who
had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So.2d
858 (Fla.1984) ("whether [a doctor] has violated
the ethical standards of his profession is a matter to be addressed by the profession itself).

Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73 (1980), then Chief
Justice Eagen, writing for a three-judge
plurality, concluded that "[disclosure of
confidences made by a patient to a physician, or even of medical data concerning
the individual patient could, under certain
circumstances, pose such a serious threat
to a patient's right not to have personal
matters revealed that it would be impermissible under either the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution."
Id. at 149-153, 415 A.2d at 77-78. However, as evidenced by the plurality's decision not to protect from discovery the particular medical records in that case,8 the
constitutional right to privacy concerning
medical information is qualified. In that
case, the court acknowledged that there
would be "a limited invasion of privacy"
but considered it "justified under the circumstances." Id. at 152 n. 11, 415 A.2d at
78 n. 11. See also Denoncourt v. Commonwealth State Ethics Commission, 504
Pa. 191, 470 A.2d 945 (1983) (the constitutional right of privacy is not absolute).
[5] Additionally, in tort law we recognize a right to privacy that is not constitutionally based. In Forster v. Manchester,
410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963), our supreme court defined the right as an "interest in not having [one's] affairs known to
others.1' Id. at 194-98,189 A.2d at 149-50.
The invasion of privacy is actionable when
there is an unreasonable and serious interference with one's privacy interest.9 None8. In In Re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73
(1980), a subpoena was issued for certain tissue
sample reports as part of an investigation involving the use and misuse of county facilities,
funds, employees, and equipment. The reports
would allow the grand jury to determine the
names of the patients whose tissue had been
submitted for testing. The supreme court concluded that the patients' physician-patient privilege and right to privacy were not offended by
the subpoena.
9. An invasion of privacy occurs when there is
an "interference with the interest of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a
secluded and private life, free from the prying
eyes, ears and publications of others." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A comment b
(1977).
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theless, an individual's right to privacy is
clearly qualified when that individual has
filed suit for personal injuries. Forster,
supra. In Forster, a plaintiff who was
suing for personal injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident, was
placed under surveillance by a private detective hired by defendant's insurance
carrier. The purpose of the investigation
was to record plaintiffs daily activities to
ascertain the freedom of movement of her
limbs. Because she felt the surveillance
was invasive, plaintiff instituted suit
against the detective for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Our supreme court found reasonable the manner in which the investigation
was conducted and denied recovery on the
invasion of privacy claim. The Court stated that
[i]n determining the extent of the interest to be protected, we must take cognizance of the fact that appellant has made
a claim for personal injuries
It is
not uncommon for defendants in accident
cases to employ investigators to check on
the validity of claims against them.
Thus, by making a claim for personal
injuries appellant must expect reasonable inquiry and investigation to be
made of her claim and to that extent
her interest in privacy is circumscribed.
Id. at 196-97, 189 A.2d at 150 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added). See also Glenn
v. Kerlin, 248 So.2d 834, 836 (La.App.1971)
(although that jurisdiction recognizes a
right to privacy and makes the invasion of
that right actionable, once plaintiff has
filed a suit for personal injuries and then
attempts to recover in tort for allegedly
wrongful disclosures by his doctor, plaintiff "no longer may claim the sanctity of
his privacy"). In Forster, the supreme
court concluded that that there is "much
social utility to be gained" from investigation of claims because "[i]t is in the best
interests of society that valid claims be
ascertained and fabricated claims be exposed." 410 Pa. at 197, 189 A.2d at 150.
The words of the supreme court in Forster
are equally applicable to the case at bar.
When Dr. Krane made his disclosures, ap-
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pellant had already commenced a medical
malpractice action wherein she alleged personal injuries. With the filing of suit, appeJJant's privacy expectations were reduced
to the extent that she could anticipate that
her claims would be investigated. It is in
society's best interest that malpractice
claims be investigated at the earliest possible stage to determine their validity.
[6] Similarly, the Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege statute reflects the
concept that there is a reduction in a patient's privacy interest and right to confidentiality when he or she files suit for
personal injuries. The statute provides
that:
[n]o physician shall be allowed, in any
civil matter, to disclose any information
which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, which
shall tend to blacken the character of the
patient, without consent of said patient,
except in civil matters brought by such
patient, for damages on account ofpersonal injuries.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5929 (emphasis added). By
enacting this statute, our legislature has
weighed competing policies to determine at
what point the physician-patient privilege is
lost or surrendered and has concluded that
this loss or surrender occurs when a party
institutes a civil action "on account of personal injuries." Appellant contends, however, that the statute sets forth the parameters of the testimonial privilege and that
the exception does not apply outside of
formal court proceedings. It was enacted,
she argues, to balance a patient's right to
privacy against the "unquestioned need for
evidence in court*1 Brief of Appellant at
27 (emphasis added).
The statute should not be interpreted so
narrowly that it encompasses only situations involving formal court proceedings.
According to the canons of construction
used in this Commonwealth, words in a
statute are to be accorded their plain meaning. Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa.
326, 446 A.2d 583 (1982); 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1903(a). Nothing in the physician-patient
privilege statute evinces a legislative intent
that the exception for "civil matters
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brought by the patient" should apply only
to disclosures made in a court-supervised
setting. Patients waive the privilege when
they institute civil actions for personal injuries. The statute applies to disclosures
without reference to the stage in the proceedings at which they are made. The
statute extends the privilege to the patient,
not to the physician. Romanowicz v. Romanotvicz, 213 Pa.Super. 382, 248 A.2d 238
(1968). By filing actions for personal injuries, the plaintiff-patients waive their privilege and, in effect, implicitly consent to
disclosures by their physicians concerning
matters relating to the plaintiff-patients'
medical conditions.

es. In fact, Section 5.07 states that "[a]
physician should respect the patient's expectations of confidentiality concerning
medical records that involve the patient's
care and treatment." As we have already
noted, an individual's expectations of confidentiality are diminished when that individual files a civil action for personal injuries.
To allow recovery at law for conduct such
as Dr. Krane's that occurred within the
context of a judicial action voluntarily instituted by appellant would ignore the fact
that appellant's privacy interest was diminished by her commencement of the malpractice suit.

[7] Finally, Pennsylvania's medical liMoreover, contrary to appellant's assercensing
statute, 63 P.S. § 422.41, does not
tions, ethical considerations and the Commonwealth's medical licensing statutes do provide appellant with a basis for a cause
not provide a clear-cut source for recogniz- of action. The statute proscribes "unpro10
The only sanctions
ing a cause of action for breach under the fessional conduct."
facts as alleged in this case. The Hippoc- that can be imposed upon a physician for
ratic Oath does not serve as an absolute unprofessional conduct are refusal, revocabar to disclosures: "Whatever in connec- tion or suspension by the board of the
tion with my professional practice, or not in doctor's license. There is no provision for
connection with it, I may see or hear in the an independent cause of action against the
lives of men which ought not to be spoken doctor for money damages, nor is there any
abroad I will not divulge
" Similarly, indication that the General Assembly inthe 1980 statement by the American Medi- tended to create one.
cal Association concerning a doctor's re[8] The policy of granting immunity
lease of confidential information is broad,
from
civil liability in the context of judicial
provides little guidance, and does not in
proceedings
also compels a finding that
any event, prohibit Dr. Krane's actions: "A
appellant
has
failed to state a cause of
physician shall respect the right of paaction
under
the
facts as alleged in this
tients, of colleagues, and of other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient case. Dr. Krane's statements were absoconfidences within the constraints of the lutely privileged from civil liability because
law.*1 Principle IV of the Medical Ethics of they were made "in the regular course of
the American Medical Association (in effect judicial proceedings and . . . [were] pertiat the time of Dr. Krane's disclosures). nent and material" to the litigation. See
One of our central concerns in this case is Post v. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 220, 507 A.2d
to determine what "ought not to be spoken 351, 355 (1986) (quoting Kemper v. Fort,
abroad" by a treating physician in the con- 219 Pa. 85, 93, 67 A. 991, 994-95 (1907)).
text of a medical malpractice action and See also Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F.Supp.
what are "the constraints of the law." See 1118, 1121 (D.Del.1982) ("[sjtrict legal relegenerally Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: vance need not be demonstrated; instead
The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the allegedly defamatory statements must
the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. have only some connection to the subject
L.Rev. 255 (1984). Even the Current Opin- matter of the pending action"). In the case
ions of the Judicial Council of the AMA do at bar, there is no allegation that Dr.
not absolutely bar disclosures of confidenc- Krane's statements were not relevant or
10. Unprofessional conduct is defined to include
that which is a "departure from or failing to

conform to an ethical or quality standard of the
profession." 63 P.S. § 422.41(8).
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not pertinent to the litigation. Furthermore, "communications pertinent to any
stage ofjudicial proceedings are accorded
an absolute privilege." Pelagatti v. Coken, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 436, 536 A.2d 1337,
1344 (1988) (emphasis added). See also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 588 comment b (1977) (the privilege protects a witness "while engaged in private conferences
with an attorney at law with reference to
proposed litigation").
The United States Supreme Court, discussing the reasons supporting this policy
of immunity, has stated:
The immunity of parties and witnesses
from subsequent damages liability for
their testimony in judicial proceedings
was well established in English common
law. . . . In the words of one 19th-century court, in damages suits against witnesses, "the claims of the individual
must yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires that the paths which
lead to ascertainment of truth should be
left as free and unobstructed as possible/' A witness' apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two
forms of censorship. First, witnesses
might be reluctant to come forward to
testify. And once a witness is on the
stand, his testimony might be distorted
by the fear of subsequent liability.
Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-333,
103 S.Ct. 1108, 1112-1114, 75 L.Ed.2d 96
(1983) (footnotes and citations omitted).
See also Collins v. Walden, 613 F.Supp.
1306, 1314 (N.D.Ga.1985), affd without
opinion, 784 F.2d 402 (Uth Cir.1986) (the
purpose of witness immunity is to ensure
that the judicial process functions "unimpeded by fear on the part of its participants
that they will be sued for damages for
their part in the proceedings").
While it is true that immunity from civil
liability in judicial proceedings has been
applied most frequently in defamation actions, many courts, including those in Pennsylvania, have extended the immunity from
civil liability to other alleged torts when
they occur in connection with judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Brown v. The Delaware Valley Transplant Program, 372 Pa.
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Super. 629, 539 A.2d 1372 (1988) (mutilation
of a corpse, civil conspiracy, and assault
and battery); Pelagatti v. Cohen, supra
(interference with contractual relationship);
Thompson v. Sikov, 340 Pa.Super. 382, 490
A.2d 472 (1985) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Passon v. Spritzer,
277 Pa.Super. 498, 419 A.2d 1258 (1980)
(malicious use and abuse of process and
invasion of privacy); Triester v. 191 Tenants Association, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 415
A.2d 698 (1979) (disparagement of title).
See also Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d
869 (1st Cir.1984) (interference with contractual relationship); Blake v. Levy, 191
Conn. 257, 464 A.2d 52 (1983) (same); Middlesex Concrete Products and Excavating
Corp. v. Carteret Industrial Association,
68 N J.Super. 85,172 A.2d 22 (1961) (same).
Such an extension of immunity evinces the
strong policy behind the privilege: to leave
reasonably unobstructed the paths which
lead to the ascertainment of truth, Briscoe,
supra, and to encourage witnesses with
knowledge of facts relevant to judicial proceedings to give "complete and unintimidated testimony," Binder v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 324, 275 A.2d 53,
56 (1971). Recognizing a cause of action
for breach of confidentiality in the factual
context of the case at bar will undermine
this policy. As one court observed:
[i]f the policy, which in defamation actions affords an absolute privilege or immunity to statements made in judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings is really to
mean anything then we must not permit
its circumvention by affording an almost
equally unrestricted action under a different label.
Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F.Supp. 1118,
1124 (D Del.1982) (quoting Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552,
117 A.2d 889, 895 (1955)) (case involving
claims of defamation, tortious interference
with contractual relationships, abuse of
process and barratry)). The court in Hoover also stated that:
[the counts of tortious interference with
contractual relationships, abuse of process, and barratry] are all predicated on
the very same acts providing the basis
for the defamation claim. Application of
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the absolute privilege solely to the defamation count . . . would be an empty
gesture indeed, if, because of artful
pleading, the plaintiff could still be
forced to defend itself against the same
conduct regarded as defamatory. Maintenance of these kindred causes of action, moreover, would equally restrain
the ability of judges, parties, counsel
and witnesses to speak and write freely
during the course of judicial proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added).
[9] Appellant argues that the cases
where the absolute privilege has been extended beyond the defamation claim can be
distinguished from the case at bar. She
argues that "plaintiffs in those cases had
no basis to complain of the fact that the
communication was made ...[;] their
grievance went solely to the content of the
communication." Brief of Appellant at 61.
However, appellant's claim is based upon
the content of Dr. Krane's communications,
not just the fact of communication. Appellant has lodged a claim against Dr. Krane
because he disclosed information pertaining
to her medical condition, not merely because he spoke with Mr. McWilliams and
the insurance representative.11
[10] Moreover,
witness
immunity
should and does extend to pre-trial communications. The policy of providing for reasonably unobstructed access to the relevant
facts is no less compelling at the pre-trial
stage of judicial proceedings. As one federal district court has stated in a case involving claims of negligence, fraudulent
and innocent misrepresentation, defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional dis11. It might be argued that while we should
extend this blanket immunity to lay witnesses, a
doctor should not be protected because of the
unique relationship between doctor and patient;
doctors should have a duty greater than lay
witnesses to protect confidences that are revealed to them by virtue of their professional
roles. We dismiss that argument as the United
States Supreme Court dismissed a similar argument in Briscoe v. Lahue, supra. In that case,
where police officers were being sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 which allows convicted persons to
assert damage claims against police officers
who gave perjured testimony at their trials, the
Court noted that the immunity analysis rests on

tress brought by a defendant-doctor in a
malpractice action against another doctor
who had prepared advisory medical reports
for a plaintiff in anticipation of a malpractice action:
The overriding concern for disclosure of
pertinent and instructive expert opinions
before and during medical malpractice
actions is no less significant than the
clearly recognized need for all relevant
factual evidence during the course of litigation
Physicians who wish to limit
groundless malpractice suits obviously
would support review of potential malpractice claims by fellow members of the
medical profession. If doctors who provide expert reports are subjected to civil
liability for the contents of their reports,
fewer doctors will be willing to evaluate
potential malpractice claims in advance
of litigation. Rather, medical experts
will only provide sworn expert testimony
in medical malpractice cases that are in
progress because witness immunity will
protect those, and only those, statements. In the absence of expert review,
then, meritless medical malpractice suits
will be eradicated less frequently prior to
filing. This result is neither desirable
nor efficient.
Kahn v. Burman, 673 F.Supp. 210, 213
(E.D.Mich.1987) (citations omitted). The
same principles apply to the case at bar.
By granting immunity from liability to the
doctor-potential witness for disclosures
made that are relevant to the malpractice
claim, the "paths which lead to ascertainment of truth" are left reasonably unobstructed, Briscoe, supra, 460 U.S. at 333,
103 S.Ct. at 1114. Meritless medical mal"functional categories," not on the status of the
witness. 460 U.S. at 342, 103 S.Ct. at 1119. The
judicial process depends on the functions of its
various "players," and immunity is granted in
order to facilitate the judicial process. A doctor-witness who is testifying as a fact witness
performs the same function as any other witness: to present evidence through testimony to
aid the tribunal in its truth-finding function.
The functioning of the tribunal is seriously
handicapped if witnesses, whether they be doctors or lay persons, fear liability from statements made by them that have some relation to
the litigation.
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practice claims can be disposed of at the
earliest possible stage of litigation by allowing free access to material and relevant
facts once a claimant has filed suit. Because the plaintiffs expectations of privacy
have been reduced with the instigation of
litigation, there is no breach of confidentiality. We therefore recognize the absolute
privilege as a bar to the claim for breach of
confidentiality against Dr. Krane.
We note, as have other courts, that ex
parte interviews are less costly12 and easier to schedule than depositions, are conducive to candor and spontaneity, are a costefficient method of eliminating non-essential witnesses in a case where a plaintiff
might have a number of treating physicians, and allow both parties to confer with
the treating physicians. See, e.g., Doe v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C.
1983); State of Missouri, ex rel. Stufflebam, M.D. v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882,
888 (Mo.App.1985). Moreover, as the district court in Eli Lilly pointed out, although the purpose of the physician-patient
privilege is to promote open communication, "the privilege was never intended . . .
to be used as a trial tactic by which a party
entitled to invoke it may control to his
advantage the timing and circumstances of
the relevant information he must inevitably see revealed at some time" 99 F.R.D.
at 128 (emphasis added).13 Further, the
12. Cf. Lazorick v. Brown, 195 NJ.Super. 444,
480 A.2d 223 (1984). In that case, the New
Jersey Superior Court held that plaintiff-patient
could not prevent his adversaries in litigation
from speaking privately with his current treating physicians about any unprivileged matter.
The court stated that
the provision for admission at trial of videotaped depositions of a treating physician or
expert witness, reflects the need to use less
costly and time consuming means of producing evidence. It is not only costly to all parties to litigation but it may be impractical and
inefficient to produce all treating doctors for
depositions without knowing in advance
whether their testimony will be useful or
helpful in resolving disputed issues.
Id. at 454-55, 480 A.2d at 229.
13. Professor Wigmore states an analogous concern:
The injury to justice by the repression of the
facts of corporal injury and disease is much
greater than any injury which might be done
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argument for preventing full disclosure of
patient confidences rests upon a policy that
seeks to promote the health of the citizen.
Informed diagnoses are to some extent impossible without complete candor by the
patient concerning his life and habits. To
encourage that candor, a cloak of confidentiality is placed upon communications by a
patient to his doctor. Nevertheless, lifting
that cloak when a patient puts his or her
physical condition in issue by filing suit
does not make it more likely that patients
will cease communicating with their doctors when they seek treatment for illnesses. It is in a patient's best interest to be
candid with his or her doctor in order to
obtain the most informed treatment possible.
Allowing ex parte interviews with treating physicians does not open the door to
any and every disclosure by a doctor concerning a plaintiffs medical condition.
Rather, disclosure should be limited to that
which is pertinent and material to the underlying litigation. If disclosures are neither pertinent nor material, they will be
inadmissible at trial. Moreover, by issuing
protective orders, a court can place restrictions on the scope of medical discovery
without actually prohibiting ex parte interviews. For example, in the malpractice
litigation underlying the instant action, the
trial court issued an order to the effect that
by disclosure. And furthermore, the few topics—such as venereal disease and abortion—
upon which secrecy might be seriously desired by the patient come into litigation ordinarily in such issues (as when they constitute
cause for a bill of divorce or a charge of
crime) that for these very facts common sense
and common justice demand that the desire
for secrecy shall not be listened to
The real support for the privilege seems to
be mainly the weight of professional medical
opinion pressing upon the legislature. And
that opinion is founded on a natural repugnance to being the means of disclosure of
personal confidence. But the medical profession should reflect that the principal issues in
which justice asks for such disclosure are
those—personal injury and life and accident
insurance—which the patient himself has voluntarily brought into court. Hence, the physician has no reason to reproach himself with
the consequences which justice requires.
8 Wigmore. Evidence § 2380(a) (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
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Dr. Krane could testify on Albert Einstein
Medical Center's behalf only as a fact witness, and not as an expert See also State
of Missouri, ex rel Stufflebam v. Appelquist, supra.
[11,12] Although a doctor who grants a
private interview in connection with judicial
proceedings would enjoy the judicial privilege protecting him from liability for defamation, he could lose that privilege by
disclosing information that has no relation
to the underlying action. Similarly, if a
doctor makes statements clearly unrelated
to a lawsuit, there might be a cause of
action stated against him for breach of
confidentiality. We, however, need not
make such a finding here because that
issue is not before us. See State of Missouri, ex rel Stufflebam v. Appelquist,
694 S.W.2d at 889 (Hogan, P.J. concurring,
noted that although a court might authorize ex parte interviews with a doctor, "the
physician who grants the interview is still
'on his own' . . . in determining whether the
scope of the questions . . . is so extensive
as to require him to expose himself to
liability . . . , [and] that a decision to grant
an interview is not without risk, and must
be strictly voluntary").
[13] Because we find that appellant has
not stated a cause of action for breach of
confidentiality under the facts of the instant case, her claims for inducement of
that breach must necessarily fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's orders
dismissing appellant's claims for breach of
confidentiality and inducement to breach.
[14] We now turn to appellant's second
group of questions involving the claim for
defamation and find that the absolute privilege which protects statements made in a
judicial context precludes appellant's defamation claim. See Pelagatti supra, 370
Pa.Super. at 438, 536 A.2d at 1345; Post v.
Mendel, supra, 510 Pa. at 220, 507 A.2d at
355. Our discussion concerning the application of the absolute privilege to bar appellant's breach of confidentiality claim is
equally applicable to the defamation claim.
[15] Appellant also argues that the
grant of summary judgment was prema-

ture in this case because she was unable to
depose McWilliams concerning a conversation that he had had with Dr. Krane after
the conclusion of the trial in her medical
malpractice action. Because McWilliams
claimed the work product privilege during
trial, both parties agreed to defer his deposition until after the disposition of the malpractice suit. We find that, again, conversations between Dr. Krane and McWilliams
are covered by the absolute privilege accorded relevant statements made in the
course of litigation. The litigation in the
medical malpractice suit was not concluded,
post-trial motions were still to be decided,
and the law suit with which we are concerned was still pending.
[16,17] We also note that appellant
failed to allege which statements made during the conversation were defamatory. Although she had not yet deposed McWilliams before filing her complaint, she had
deposed Dr. Krane. A complaint for defamation must, on its face, identify specifically what allegedly defamatory statements were made, and to whom they were
made. Failure to do so will subject the
complaint to dismissal for lack of publication. See Gross v. United Engineers and
Constructors, Inc., 224 Pa.Super. 233, 235,
302 A.2d 370, 372 (1973); see also Raneri
v. DePolo, 65 Pa.Commw. 183, 186, 441
A.2d 1373, 1375 (1982). Further, the trial
court found that all the defamatory statements that were alleged with specificity
were made to privileged persons. Appellant did allege in her complaint that defamatory remarks were made to "other persons"; ostensibly, these were non-privileged communications. She has failed,
however, to make to this Court, or to the
trial court, any argument that these other
persons actually could have existed. She
only claims that failure to permit her to
have access to McWilliams' records prevented her from obtaining corroborating
information.
We find that it would be unreasonable to
draw the inference from the few facts with
which appellant has presented us that defamatory statements were made in a nonprivileged context. We hold therefore that
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing her claim for defamation.
The orders of the trial court are affirmed.
CIRILLO, President Judge, files a
concurring and dissenting Opinion in
which OLSZEWSKI and TAMILIA, JJ.,
join.
DEL SOLE, J., files a concurring
statement.
CIRILLO, President Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority's
resolution of the issues involved in this
case, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part I agree with the majority's
disposition of the defamation claim before
us. I believe, however, that some cause of
action should exist in this Commonwealth
for a physician's breach of the duty of
confidentiality to a patient. Because the
majority finds that Moses is precluded
from stating a claim for breach by her
underlying medical malpractice action, it
fails to reach this issue. I would hold that
such a cause of action exists, and that
Moses has alleged sufficient facts to make
out a claim for breach.
In July of 1977, Pearlena Moses was
admitted to the emergency room of Albert
Einstein Medical Center, an appellee in this
case. Moses was diagnosed by an intern as
suffering from pelvic inflammatory disease, and treated for that condition. Moses' symptoms worsened, and she was referred by her family doctor to appellee Dr.
Marvin Krane, who specialized in gynecology and obstetrics. Dr. Krane performed a
total abdominal hysterectomy on Moses, removing both ovaries, the uterus, and the
fallopian tubes. Dr. Krane continued to
treat and monitor Moses after the surgery;
she was released into the care of her family
physician in November of 1977. Moses
then brought suit against Albert Einstein,
alleging that the negligent care she had
received there necessitated the total hysterectomy.
In her complaints, Moses alleged, inter
alia, that because her treating physician,
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Dr. Krane, had agreed to help defense
counsel in preparing the case for Albert
Einstein Medical Center, he breached the
duty of confidentiality owed to her as his
patient. Moses also alleged that information given by Krane to the effect that she
suffered from venereal disease, specifically
gonorrhea, rather than pelvic inflammatory
disease, was defamatory. Appellees Dr.
Krane, Underwriters' Adjusting Company,
Albert Einstein Medical Center, and Daniel
T. McWilliams moved for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings.
Those motions were granted by the trial
court, and a consolidated appeal followed.
After consideration of that appeal, a panel
of this court determined that because this
case involves issues of first impression in
this Commonwealth, and of great societal
and legal import, it should be certified for
en banc review.
Moses' allegations on appeal raise two
issues before this court. Her first three
arguments deal with the establishment of a
cause of action in tort for a physician's
breach of his confidential relationship with
his patient. Moses argues, first, that such
a cause of action should exist; secondly,
that a physician's judicially unsupervised
and unauthorized communications should
give rise to that cause of action; and lastly,
that in such a context the defense of absolute privilege should not be available to
that physician. Moses' last two arguments
concern her claim for defamation and are
intertwined with the physician/patient confidentiality theory. She argues that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment before depositions were concluded,
and also that the appellees should not be
accorded the absolute privilege defense
where the patient's confidentiality rights
have been breached.
The majority refuses to create a new
cause of action in this Commonwealth for a
physician's breach of confidentiality in a
physician/patient relationship. Instead, it
confines itself to what it terms "the narrow
factual context of this case." I am of the
opinion that the policies and principles of
this Commonwealth require the recognition
of a cause of action for breach of the
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physician/patient relationship. Further, I
strongly disagree with the majority's conclusion that the filing of the underlying
tort action which placed the patient's condition in issue is sufficient to permit the ex
parte disclosure of information revealed by
the patient to his or her doctor as a result
of that confidential relationship.
The issue of whether or not a patient
should be accorded a cause of action for a
physician's breach of confidentiality is a
case of first impression in this Commonwealth. The majority of jurisdictions that
have considered this issue have allowed the
claim. Only one jurisdiction has held that
the cause of action should not be available.
In Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651,
389 S.W.2d 249 (1965), the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to alter the common
law rule existing in that state which held
that neither a patient nor a physician had a
privilege to refuse to disclose in court or to
a third person a communication of one to
the other. Id. at 655, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
After examining the statutes of that state,
the court held that it could find nothing
which would allow a cause of action in the
face of the common law rule. It stated
that that state's licensing statutes and statutes defining ethical conduct were merely
administrative provisions. Id. at 656, 389
S.W.2d at 251-52. It held further that
statutes concerning evidentiary privileges
were just that, and did not bolster appellant's argument that a cause of action
should exist. According to the court, "the
petitioner is trying to base a cause of action upon a rule of evidence." Id. at 657,
389 S.W.2d at 252.
After considering the case law from other jurisdictions, I would conclude that the
better reasoned approach is to allow such a
cause of action. I do not think that a
claimant's argument in such a case would
be based upon a rule of evidence. It is
rather based upon a relationship that has
for centuries been accorded the highest
degree of sanctity by the profession itself,
as well as by society as a whole. In determining whether this relationship should
give rise to a cause of action, I would
follow the lead of the District of Columbia
court in Vassiliades v. GarfinckeVs,

Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C.App.1985),
and examine Pennsylvania's licensing statutes, evidentiary rules and privileged communications statutes, common law principles of trust, and the Hippocratic Oath and
principles of medical ethics. Vassiliades,
492 A.2d at 590. Moses had cited all these
possible sources of public policy in her complaint.
The physician/patient relationship was
first articulated in the Fifth Century, B.C.
in the Hippocratic Oath of the medical profession. It states in pertinent part that:
Whatever in connection with my professional practice or not in connection with
it I see or hear in the life of men which
ought not to be spoken abroad I will not
divulge as recommending that all such
should be kept secret.
As the Oath demonstrates, for over two
thousand years, physicians have recognized
a duty to protect the confidences of their
patients, and society has tacitly relied upon
that principle.
The AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics,
adopted in 1977, show the continuing vitality of this obligation. The principles provide that "[a] physician shall respect the
rights of patients, of colleagues, and of
other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law."
Further, the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA also reflects these
values. Section 5.05 of the Opinions states:
The information disclosed to a physician
during the course of the relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree —
The physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the express consent of the patient,
unless required to do so by law.
Section 5.07 states:
Both the protection of confidentiality and
the appropriate release of information in
records is the rightful expectation of the
patient. A physician should respect the
patient's expectations of confidentiality
concerning medical records that involve
the patient's care and treatment.
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These ethical directives illustrate the manner in which the medical profession views
the divulgence of confidences made to a
physician by his patient.
These considerations, however, are not
merely ethical objectives to which the medical community aspires Public pohcv I inn
rors these considerations in licensing regulations and testimonial privilege statutes.
State legislation codifies the result of socie
ty's balance of policies promoting full disclosure of patient confidences in a judicial
setting, and protecting the patient's inter
est in complete non-disclosure. See, e.g
Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 955 (Ala
1984). The narrow exceptions which seem
to typify this type of legislation illustrate
the great weight attached to non-disclo
sure. See, e.g., Hope v. Landau, 21 Mass.
App. 240, 241, 486 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1985)
Testimonial privilege statutes as well as
statutes concerning licensing of physicians
have played a significant role in the acceptance by most states of the breach of confidentiality cause of action. See Home v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 706, 287 So.2d 824,
827 (1973) (those states which had enacted
a physician/patient testimonial privilege
statute were almost uniform in allowing
the cause of action for breach of confiden
tiality, those which had not enacted such a
statute were split on that issue); see also
Vassiliades, supra; Geisberger i Willuhn, 72 Ill.App.3d 435, 436, 28 Ill.Dec. 586,
588, 390 N.E.2d 945, 947 (1979); Alberts v.
Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 65-66, 479 N.E.2d
113, 119 (1985); MacDonald v. dinger, 84
A.D.2d 482, 484, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803
(1982); Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 NJ.Super
392, 396, 476 A.2d 1279, 1281 (1984); Hum

phers v. First National Bank, 298 Or. 706,
718-719, 696 P.2d 527, 535 (1985). Accord
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, 797 (N.D.Ohio E D
1965) (applying Ohio law).
Pennsylvania has a testimonial privilege
statute which promotes the confidentiality
of patient/physician communications 42
Pa.C.S. § 5929 states:
; 5929. Physicians not to disclose information
No physician shall be allowed, m an) civil
matter, to disclose any information which
he acquired in attending the patient in a
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of the patient, without consent of
said patient, except in civil matters
brought by such patient for damages on
account of personal injuries
42 Pa.CS. § 5929. The Commonwealth has
also promulgated licensing statutes to provide its citizens with the best possible medical care. To this end, disciplinary or corrective measures may be imposed by the
licensing board upon a physician if he or
she is "guilty of immoral or unprofessional
conduct. Unprofessional conduct shall include departure from or failing to conform
to an ethical or quality standard of the
profession
The ethical standards of a
profession are those ethical tenets which
are embraced by the professional community in this Commonwealth." 63 P.S.
§ 422.41(8) & (8)(i)
In Pennsylvania, therefore, ethical considerations are not merely aspirational,
they present a duty to practicing physicians, although no legal liability attaches

1. Although public policy is a somewhat elusi\e
concept, the Ohio Supreme Court defined it succinctly m Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St
Louis R.R. Co v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St 64 US
N.E 505 (1916)In substance, it may be said to be the community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to
matters of public morals, public health, public
safety, public welfare and the like It is that
general and well settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to all the circum
stances of each particular relation and situa
tion

Sometimes such public policy is declared by
Constitution, sometimes by statute, sometimes by judicial decision. More often, however, it abides only in the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear consciousness and conviction of what is naturally
and inherently just and right between man
and man.
Public policy is the cornerstone—the foundation—of all Constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude,
its height and its depth, greater than any or all
of them.
Id. at 68, 115 N.E. at 507
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statutorily as a result of the breach of 'that
duty. We are then faced with the question
of whether disciplinary sanctions such as
suspension of a license are sufficient to
protect the policies involved here. The majority indicates that disciplinary action
should be adequate and appropriate. I disagree. Consideration of those policies indicates that more is needed than administrative sanctions, because more than health is
involved.

of man. Nothing material is more important or more intimate to man than the
health of his mind and body. Since the
iayman is unfamiliar with the road to
recovery, he cannot sift the circumstances of his life and habits to determine
what is information pertinent to his
health. As a consequence, he must disclose all information in his consultations
with his doctor—even that which is embarrassing, disgraceful or incriminating.
To promote full disclosure, the medical
It is true that the argument for preventprofession extends the promise of secreing full disclosure of patient confidences
cy
The candor which this promise
centers on the health of the individual:
elicits
is
necessary to the effective purAny time a doctor undertakes the treatsuit of health; there can be no reticence,
ment of a patient, and the consensual
no reservation, no reluctance when parelationship of physician and patient is
tients
discuss their problems with their
established, two jural obligations (of sigdoctors.
But the disclosure is certainly
nificance here) are simultaneously asintended
to
be private.
sumed by the doctor. Doctor and patient
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 801-802. See
enter into a simple contract, the patient
also Alberts, 395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d
hoping that he will be cured, and the
at 118; Hague v. Williams, 37 NJ. 328,
doctor optimistically assuming that he
335-36, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962); Berry v.
wi)) be compensated. As an implied conMoench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 196, 331 P.2d 814,
dition of that contract ..., the doctor
817 (1958). Society is concerned not merewarrants that any confidential informaly with the health of the community, but
tion gained through the relationship will with the dignity and privacy of its memnot be released without the patient's per- bers. That dignity and privacy are violated
mission.
where the fiduciary relationship between a
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 801. This patient and physician—a relationship built
promise may be justifiably relied upon by on the highest expectation of trust—is bethe patient. "Almost every member of the trayed.
public is aware of the promise of discretion
This court has already expressed its concontained in the Hippocratic Oath, and ev- cern over the "total" care of the patient
ery person has a right to rely upon this and our disapproval of any interference
warranty of silence." Id. A patient lays with the relationship between physician
bare the sanctum sanctorum of his physical and patient. In Alexander v. Knight, 197
and psychological self to his physician in Pa.Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962), the plainhis belief in the integrity of this promise. tiff wife had suffered whiplash in a car
In many cases, he has no choice if he accident. During litigation, her doctor rewishes to be healed. If the physician then leased information without her consent to
breaks his vow, and divulges these confi- the doctor hired by defendant to interview
dences, he outrages the very foundation of him. We adopted the trial court's opinion
society's concept of the physician as healer. m that case. Even though that court did
While it is obvious that effective medical not find that incident necessary to the distreatment is essential to the health and position of the case, it was nonetheless
well-being of both society and its members, disturbed by the actions of both doctors:
the concern for confidentiality in the relaWe are of the opinion that members of a
tionship goes beyond these considerations:
profession, especially the medical profesWhen a patient seeks out a doctor and
sion, stand in a confidential or fiduciary
retains him, he must admit him to the
capacity as to their patients. They owe
most private part, of the material domain
their patients more than just medical
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care for which payment is exacted; there
is a duty of total care; that includes and
comprehends a duty to aid the patient in
litigation, to render reports when necessary, and to attend court when needed.
That further includes a duty to refuse
affirmative assistance to the patient's antagonist in litigation. The doctor, of
course, owes a duty to his conscience to
speak the truth; he need, however, speak
only at the proper time
[I]nducing
. . . [the] breach of . . . a confidential
relationship [between a doctor and pa
tient] is to be and is condemned.
Knight, 177 A.2d at 1462. In this Commonwealth, then, public policy, or as the
Ohio Supreme Court has defined it, the
"clear consciousness and conviction of
what is naturally and inherently just and
right between man and man/' Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati Chicago and St Louis R.R.
Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 68, 115 N.E.
505, 507 (1916), envisions that the physician
owes a duty of a fiduciary, of trust and
faith to his patient, and, in justice, the
patient should reasonably be able to rely
upon that duty.
I would find, therefore, that there must
be a legal remedy allowed the patient in
such a case in order to emphasize the importance of the physician/patient relationship and to protect the dignity of the relationship as well as the health of the patient
Public policy in this Commonwealth and
society's obvious valuation of the relationship in question demands this result.

supra. Although that relationship is partially founded in a contract between patient
and physician from which evolves a fiduciary duty and an expectation of confidentiality, I am in agreement with the courts of
Massachusetts and New York which have
stated: "We believe that the relationship
contemplates an additional duty springing
from but extraneous to the contract, and
that the breach of such duty is actionable
as a tort." MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 486,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 804; see also Alberts, 395
Mass at 69, 479 N.E.2d at 120 (contractual
relationship gives rise to a duty of confidentiality).
As a cause of action, in tort, the plaintiff
must then establish the four elements of a
prima facie case—a duty, breach of that
duty, causation, and damages. The duty
arises out of the existence of the relationship between patient and physician. Moses
has alleged the existence of that duty; she
states in her complaint that Dr. Krane was
her treating physician, and that those statutes and ethical considerations that we
have discussed created a duty of confidentiality which should not have been violated.
What we are concerned with here is not
plaintiffs ability to show that a duty exists, but with defendant's justification for
the breach. Those jurisdictions that have
accepted the cause of action for breach of
confidentiality have noted that the duty is
not absolute, since the statutory testamentary privilege is not absolute. Where disclosure of information is important for the
safety of the individual or is in the public
interest, then the doctor may reveal those
confidences without liability. See Humphers, 298 Or. at 720, 696 P.2d at 535; see
also Home, 291 Ala. at 709, 287 So.2d at
830; Alberts, 395 Mass. at 75, 479 N.E.2d
at 124; MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 487, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 805; Berry, 8 Utah 2d at 196,
331 P.2d at 817; accord Hammonds, 243
F.Supp. at 801.

The next consideration must be to define
the parameters of this cause of action so
that they are inclusive enough to serve
these purposes. Initially, I would note that
I agree with those jurisdictions that have
found that this claim is brought in tort,
rather than in contract law. Relegating a
plaintiff to a cause of action in contract
would severely limit the damages which
could be recovered. MacDonald, 84 A.D.
2d at 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804. Further,
Further, as with the testimonial privi
w e have already recognized the importance lege, where the patient is shown to have
of the fiduciary aspect of the physician/pa- consented to the disclosure, the physician
tient relationship in Alexander v. Knight, may not be held liable for making it. See,
2
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e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.,
148 Ill.App.3d 581, 590, 102 Ill.Dec. 172,
177, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (1986) cert denied
sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, — U.S.
,
107 S.Ct. 3232, 97 L.Ed.2d 738 (1987); Alberts, 395 Mass. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124;
Landau, 21 Mass.App. at 241, 486 N.E.2d
at 90; Hague, 37 N J . at 336, 181 A.2d at
349; Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.2d 148,
150, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979) affd
mem., 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887
(1979) That consent may be expressly given, as in a writing. Here the issue revolves around the question of implied consent
Most states have held that when a patient files a law suit in which her medical
condition is placed in issue, she has impliedly consented to the disclosure of information which had been confidential. She has
waived her privilege which prevents her
doctor from testifying. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5929; Dennie v. University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, 638 F.Supp.
1005, 1008 (W.D.Pa.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also Bond v. District
Court, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984) (en
banc); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn.
405, 407, 240 N.W.2d 333, 335 (1976); Jaap
v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389, 1391
(Mont.1981); Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H.
106, 109, 534 A.2d 720, 722 (1987). The
rationale behind this policy is that it is
inconsistent for a patient litigant to base a
claim upon his medical condition and then
use the privilege to prevent the opposing
party from obtaining and presenting conflicting evidence pertaining to that condition. Bond, 682 P.2d at 38.
The same considerations apply in a situa
tion where a patient is attempting to bring
a suit against her physician for breach of
the duty of confidentiality. In a sense, this
is similar to a medical malpractice action
where the physician being sued must be
allowed to testify about the patient's condition in order to put his version of the facts
before the jury. Panko v. Consolidated
Mutual Insurance Co., 423 F.2d 41, 44
(3rd Cir.1970) (applying Pennsylvania law).
Other courts have handled these situations
in similar manners. The majority of jurisdictions have held that a patient waives his

right to a physician's full confidentiality
when he puts his medical condition into
issue in a law suit:
[An] . . . exception[ ] [to the physician's
duty of confidentiality] arises where . . .
the physical condition of the patient is
made an element of a claim ... [even
when] that claim has not yet been
pressed to litigation
[T]he same policy which during litigation permits, even
demands disclosure of information acquired during the course of the physician-patient relationship allows the disclosure thereof to the person against
whom the claim is being made, when
recovery is sought prior to or without
suit. At this point the public interest in
an honest and just result assumes dominance over the individual's right of nondisclosure.
Hague, 37 N.J at 336, Ihl A.2d at 349.
See also Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 954
(Ala.1984); Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 127
Misc.2d 124, 126, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462
(Sup.1985); accord Hammonds,
243
F.Supp. at 800. Once a patient puts his
condition into issue, he is recognizing that
his dignity and privacy are no longer of
paramount importance. The balance of
concerns is settled on the side of disclosure.
We are then faced with the question of how
to resolve the balance when, although the
patient has placed his medical condition
into issue, his physician, without his knowledge or actual consent, enters into an ex
parte interview with the defendant's attorney.
I atn persuaded by the reasoning of
those jurisdictions which forbid such interviews because to sanction such interviews
would be to vitiate the physician/patient
privilege. While the testimonial privilege
may be waived to a limited extent by the
patient litigant's placing her medical condition in issue, to say that the relationship is
"waived" means nothing:
"Waiver" does not authorize a private
conference between a doctor and a defense lawyer. It is one thing to say that
a doctor may be examined and cross-examined by the defense in a courtroom, in
conformity with the rules of evidence,
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with the vigilant surveillance of plaintiffs counsel, and the careful scrutiny of
the trial judge; it is quite another matter
to permit, as alleged here, an unsupervised conversation between the doctor
and and his patient's protagonist
[T]he mere waiver of a testimonial privilege does not release the doctor from his
duty of secrecy and from his duty of
loyalty in litigation and no one may be
permitted to induce the breach of these
duties.
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 805. To approach the analysis from the perspective of
"waiver" does not resolve the problem of
how to balance competing interests here.
Some jurisdictions when faced with this
question in an action for personal injuries
or medical malpractice suits have held that
ex parte interviews are proper. See Arctic
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d
1006 (Alaska 1977); Coralluzzo v. Fass,
450 So.2d 858 (Fla.1984); State ex rel
Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882
(Mo.App.1985); Lazorick v. Brown, 195
N J . Super. 444, 480 A.2d 223 (1984). Accord Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D.
126 (D.D.C.1983). There are several rationales behind this rule. Several of these
jurisdictions have found that no statutory
or common law prohibition against ex parte
interviews exists, and so have refused to
prohibit them in these situations. Coralluzzo, 450 So.2d at 859. Other courts have
pointed out that no party has a proprietary
right to evidence. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d
at 888; accord Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D.
at 128. For the most part, however, jurisdictions which permit ex parte interviews
have focused on time and cost restraints.
They base their holdings on the misconception that ex parte interviews are less costly
and time consuming than the alternative
method, that is, formal discovery. TransWorld Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d
1148, 1152 (Alaska 1976); Lazorick, 195
N.J. Super, at 454-455, 480 A.2d at 229;
accord Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D at 128.
In State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, supra, a Missouri court prohibited a
judge from denying a motion to compel the
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to
authorize the defendant's interview with
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one of his treating doctors That court,
quoting extensively from Doe v. Eli Lilly
& Co., supra, found that ex parte interviews were less costly than depositions and
easier to schedule. It also found that such
interviews were more conducive to spontaneity and candor, and therefore more desirable. According to the Missouri court, an
ex parte interview was a cost-efficient way
in which to eliminate unnecessary witnesses. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d at 888. See
also Lazorick, 195 N J.Super. at 455, 480
A.2d at 229; accord Eli Lilly & Co., 99
F.R.D. at 128
In Lazorick v. Brorvn, supra, the New
Jersey Superior Court held that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case should be
required to sign a waiver allowing the defendant to discuss her condition with treating physicians citing the excessive cost of
formal discovery. That court pointed out
that the discovery rules were not the only
methods by which discovery could be conducted. Further, the court refused to assume that defense counsel would take advantage of the absence of plaintiffs counsel at such an interview to elicit privileged
information. Lazorick, 195 NJ.Super. at
455-56, 480 A.2d at 229. The court stated
that even though it might be considered
unjust for a doctor to "go over to another
camp," that doctor should be allowed to
serve justice as he saw it, or, as in this
case, to help another doctor. Id. "The
justice system should [not be made to] pay
this price so that the doctor-patient relationship will not be bruised." Id. at 456,
480 A.2d at 230.
In Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, the
federal district court for the District of
Columbia cited all these reasons in finding
that a plaintiff was required to authorize
the interview between her treating physician and defense counsel It went on to
express concern over the possibility that
the testimonial privilege, if extended to ex
parte interviews, could become a trial tactic, allowing plaintiffs counsel to monitor
the progress of the defense:
The privilege was never intended
to
be used as a trial tactic by which a party
entitled to invoke it may control to his
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advantage the timing and circumstances
of the release of information he must
inevitably see revealed at some time.
Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. at 128.
The majority indicates that it, too, is con
cerned with time and costs. I, howe\ er,
agree with those courts that have forbidden ex parte interviews of treating physicians by adverse parties, regardless of
costs, on the basis that they are violative of
public policy. See Mull, 448 So.2d at 955;
Petrillo, 148 Ill.App.3d at 593, 102 Ill.Dec.
at 177, 499 N.E.2d at 957; Wenninger, 307
Minn, at 410-11, 240 N.W.2d at 337; Jaap,
623 P.2d at 1392; Nelson, 130 N.H. at 111,
534 A.2d at 723; Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M.
358, 360, 743 P.2d 114, 116 (1987); Stoller
v. Moo Young Jun, 118 A.D.2d 637, 637,
499 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (1986); Anker, 98
Misc. 2d at 152-153, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 584;
Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash.2d 675, 677,
756 P.2d 138, 140 (1988); accord Manion v.
N.P.W. Medical Center, 676 F.Supp. 585,
594-95 (M.D.Pa.1987). I am aware that
most of these cases involve evidentiary concerns rather than theories of liability in
tort, but I would find their reasoning instructive and applicable to the present situation. The presence of plaintiffs counsel
at an interview between the plaintiffs physician and defense counsel prevents the
inadvertent disclosure of irrelevant information which may overstep the boundaries
of the privilege and lead to the discovery of
embarrassing and harmful information.
Roosevelt Hotel Limited Partnership v.
Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986).
Wenninger, 307 Minn, at 411, 240 N.W.2d
at 337; Nelson, 130 N.H. at 111, 534 A.2d
at 723; Anker, 98 Misc.2d at 152-153, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 585; Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at
677, 756 P.2d at 140.

499 N.E.2d at 963; Ashby, 106 N.M. at 360,
743 P.2d at 116; Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at
677, 756 P.2d at 140. I also am in disagreement with statements that refusal to allow
ex parte interviews in some way presents a
tactical advantage to the plaintiff. I do not
believe that requiring compliance with formal discovery methods gives plaintiffs the
ability to somehow uncover the defense's
trial strategy, any more than it would in
any other cause of action. As the Washington Supreme Court stated, "[T]he argument that depositions unfairly allow plaintiffs to determine defendants' trial strategy does not comport with a purpose behind
the discovery rules—to prevent surprise at
trial." Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 680, 756
P.2d at 142.
In any case, I agree with both the Illinois
and the Washington courts that the time
consumed as well as the costs involved in
formal discovery do not create such a hardship here as to require us to allow ex parte
interviews. I fail to see how allowance of
ex parte interviews would in any way lead
to truth in the litigation process. I agree
with the Illinois court that the doctor's
opinion in an ex parte interview should not
differ from that expressed at a deposition
or in interrogatories. Petrillo, 148 Ill.App.
3d at 597, 102 Ill.Dec. at 183, 499 N.E.2d at
963; see also Ashby, 106 N.M. at 360, 743
P.2d at 116. Allowing an ex parte interview in no way balances properly the concerns of both parties and of public policy.
I find that such concerns are more appropriately met by requiring that formal discovery methods be followed.

Of course, counsel are free to agree to
methods of discovery, if they so choose. I
would note with approval the requirement
of
the Alaska Supreme Court in Arctic
Further, I note, as did the Illinois court
Motor
Freight that "counsel . . . confer in
in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.,
supra, w hich I would find most persuasive, good faith concerning discovery . . . , [that
that concern with excessive discovery time they] exchange information and comply
and costs is also misplaced. Depositions with discovery requests 'in a manner demare not the only way in which a defendant onstrating candor and common sense.'"
can conduct discovery aside from the ex Arctic Motor Freight, Inc., 571 P.2d at
parte interview. As the Petrillo court not- 1009 (quoting Trans-World Investments v.
ed, methods of formal discovery may just Drobny, 554 P.2d at 1152). I am hard
as easily serve the purpose. Petrillo, 148 pressed to understand how that is to occur,
IU.App.3d at 596-97, 102 Ill.Dec. at 183, however, in situations like the one present-
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ly before uu, win it neither the appellant our own and other jurisdictions which they
nor her counsel was aware of the inter- advance as having extended the concept of
view, and where the patient-litigant's physi- absolute privilege for statements arining in
cian rushes to the aid of defense counsel. litigation to causes of action oth^r than
Further, 1 am convinced that ex parte defamation, see, e.g., Thompson vt Sikov
interviews are improper because the ratio- 340 Pa.Super. 382, 490 A.2d 472 (l»85)
nales utilized by those jurisdictions allow- (statements did not give rise to cnune of
ing such interviews do not address the action for intentional infliction of emotional
heart of the problem, that is, the violation distress because privileged under f 4g
of the fiduciary duty that a physician owes comment g, of Restatement (Second) of
his patient. Any attempt to balance com- Torts); Passon v. Spritzer, 277 Pa.Super
498, 419 A.2d 1258 (1980) (absolute privipeting interests must take this into if
lege applied to allegedly libellouM utatecount.
ments contained in petition for writ of haPrivate nonadversary interviews oJ a
beas corpus); Triester v. 191 Tenant* Asdoctor bv adverse counsel would offer no
sociation, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 415 A,2d 698
.. protection to the patient's right of (1979) (statements did not give rise to cause
privacy The presence of the patient's of action for disparagement of title because
counsel at the doctor's interrogation per- privileged under Restatement (Second) of
mits the patient to know what his testi- Torts, § 635).
mony is, allays a patient's fears that his
At first glance, it would seem thai appeldoctor may be disclosing personal confilees
have set out a plausible argument for
dences, and thus helps preserve the complete trust between doctor and patient expansion of the privileges connected with
which is essential to the successful treat- defamation to the present cause of action.
A closer examination of the cases cited and
ment of the patient's condition.
of
the Restatement (Second) of Tortu, upon
Wenninger, 307 Mum al 411, 240 N 1 M
which
they in some part rely, negate* this
at 337. See also Ashby, 106 N.M. at 360,
impression, however The Restatement
743 P.2d at 116; Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at
(Second) of Torts outlines the absolute priv679 156 P.2d at 141 Beyond allowing for
ileges available in actions for defamution in
the successful treatment of the patient, the
sections 583 to 592A. These sections are
ability to be present, in actuality or
given wider application by section* 635
through counsel, preserves the trust of \\w
(making the privileges available in uotions
patient in his or her chosen physician. It
for injurious falsehood) and 652F (milking
removes the concern for trespass to the
the privileges available in actions for invapatient's dignity and psyche, a concern sion of privacy), and apply to w i t n e s s
which strikes at the heart of this fiduciary jurors, parties to judicial proceedings,
relationship.
judges, legislators, administrative officers
The appellees, Dr Krane, Albert Em
husbands and wives, and attorneys \\\ | u w
stein, and Underwriters, all argue that With the exception of the section drilling
these facts will not support Moses' claim with husbands and wives, these Htvtmns
for breach of confidentiality because any give to persons in the described m| rH a
statements made in connection with litiga- privilege to publish otherwise actionable
tion or pending litigation are absolutely material as some part of a judicial or Ir^mprivileged in a defamation context. Binder lative proceeding in which the permit, w | l()
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, asserts the privilege is involved str id
323, 275 A.2d 53, 56 (1971). Appellees ar- §§ 585-592. This "privilege," which ,„ u c .
gue that since the breach of confidentiality tually in the nature of an immunit\ i r o m
claim arises from the same set of facts suit, see 3 Restatement (Second) oi r o r ts
which are asserted as giving rise to the § 585, Introductory Note, has the effort of
defamation claim, the privilege should ap- providing insulation from liability fot Mfnteply as a complete defense to that claim as ments which are related to a judmu! or
well. They cite to us a series of cases from legislative proceeding, but would In w, tmn_
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able if made in another context. Nothing
in the cases cited by appellees or in the
Restatement sections outlining this immunity, however, addresses its applicability in
respected confidential relationship between
the declarant and the individual who is the
subject of the statements, the subject has a
countervailing privilege which would prohibit the declarant from making statements
violative of his duty to the subject, even in
court. The attachment, whether by common law tradition or legislative enactment,
of such a privilege to the confidential relationship recognizes a public policy favoring
the relationship which outweighs even the
policy to promote truth-finding in judicial
and legislative proceedings.
Appellees would have us hold that the
absolute immunity doctrine is widening. I
do not think it has widened so far as to
encompass this cause of action which I
would espouse. Consider the most recent
cases appellees cite to us from this court,
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 536
A.2d 1337 (1987) and Brown v. Delaware
Valley Transplant Program, 372 Pa.Stfper. 629, 632, 539 A.2d 1372, 1374 (1988).
While these cases do hold that the immunity insulates attorneys from liability for intentional torts against third parties based
upon actions which were performed in a
judicial context, they do not stand for the
proposition that the immunity would apply
if the tort alleged were based upon actions
taken by the attorney against his own
client. Thus appellees' arguments based
on Pelagatti and Brown fail to convince us
that the absolute immunity doctrine must
swallow up any cause of action for breach
of confidentiality in a judicial setting. This
is underlined by the Restatement section
discussing the absolute liability for attorneys during a judicial proceeding. Comment a to section 586 states, "The privilege
stated in this Section is based upon a public
policy of securing to attorneys as officers
of the court the utmost freedom in their
efforts to secure justice for their clients."
3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 586 (1977)
(emphasis added).
Further, an examination of these Restatement sections shows that public policy

considerations behind the absolute privilege
doctrine have, in most jurisdictions, been
considered and discarded in favor of confidentiality in such situations. The doctrine
oifetooYofceprrotege ISVDTB ixiYi ftBttosxiTe
on the part of witnesses or potential witnesses in a litigation setting:
This privilege exists in favor of counsel
so that he will be permitted to represent
his client's interests to the fullest extent
. . . All persons involved in a judicial
proceeding are encouraged by this privilege to speak frankly and argue freely
without danger or concern that they may
be required to defend their statements in
a later defamation action.
Smith v. Griffiths, 327 Pa.Super. 418, 423,
476 A.2d 22, 25 (1984). This was the rationale behind the Pelagatti decision. Pelagatti, 370 Pa.Super. at 436, 536 A.2d at
1344. In contrast, as has already been
discussed, the public policy of this Commonwealth has attempted to balance the
competing concerns of the desirability in a
Wtigation setting oi ixiY> Qisc^DBxtre \*y a
physician -against the patient litigant's desire for no disclosure whatsoever. The existence of a statute which provides for limited disclosure in a litigation context is
illustrative of finding that balance in favor
of limiting disclosure. The balance therefore favors the rights of the patient litigant. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C.
App.1985) (existence of licensing statute,
which prevents disclosure except for situations involving gunshot wounds, and evidentiary code, which precludes testifying
except in limited situations, found not applicable, illustrative of public policy encouraging patient candor and physician confidentiality). Because we attach great weight to
the fiduciary duty that the physician owes
to his patient, we have found that a cause
of action should exist where that confidence is breached, especially where the
physician has engaged in ex parte conferences:
At the very heart of every fiduciary relationship, including that between a patient
and his physician, there exists an atmosphere of trust and faith in the discretion
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of the fiduciary. That being so, we find
it difficult to believe that a physician can
engage in an ex parte conference with
the legal adversary of his patient without
endangering the trust and faith invested
in him by his patient
Petrillo, 148 Ill.App.3d at 595, 102 Ill.Dec.
at 182, 499 N.E.2d at 962. To hold that an
absolute privilege should exist here would
be to advance the importance of disclosure
over trust and faith, and would eviscerate
the very relationship we have set out to
protect.
I must point out that refusing to apply
the doctrine of absolute privilege in this
instance in no way bruises the adversary
system, a concern of the New Jersey court
in Lazorick v. Brawn, 195 NJ.Super. at
456, 480 A.2d at 231. In this Commonwealth, the balance achieved by the legislature will not be upset by any decision to
join those jurisdictions which require formal discovery methods to be followed in
situations where the physician/patient relationship is at risk. Obviously, a physician
who has the consent of his patient would
not be in danger of any suit here, Baker v.
Lafayette College, 350 Pa.Super. 68, 72,
504 A.2d 247, 249 (1986); see 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583 (1977) (consent is a defense to defamation claim), and
during formal discovery, sanctioned by the
court, the patient has clearly given his consent. Such measures balance considerations, because they allow disclosure in controlled situations, and in doing so, protect
the relationship to which our courts and
legislature have attached such importance.
Further, because I would find that the
physician/patient relationship is so important to society, I would also hold that inducing the breach should give rise to a
cause of action in tort. See, e.g., Alberts,
395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d at 119; accord
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp at 803 Although
I would not consider this to be a cause of
action sounding strictly in contract, I note
that tortious interference with contractual
relations is also a basis for liability. See
Buczek v. First National Bank, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 557, 531 A 2d 1122, 1124 (1987) I
would find this to be analogous to a cause
of action for inducing the breach of confi-

dentiality. Again, the physician stands in a
fiduciary relation to his patient See Alexander, 177 A.2d at 146. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts finds that such an inducement is the basis for liability.
Section 874 defines the violation of a
fiduciary duty as follows:
§ 874. Violation of Fiduciary Duty
One standing in a fiduciary relation with
another is subject to liability to the other
for harm resulting from a breach of duty
imposed by the relation.
4 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 874 (ed.
1979). Comment c to that section states,
"A person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of tortious conduct, and is liable
for the harm thereby caused." The comment then cites to Section 876 of the Restatement, which says, in turn:
§ 876. Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another, one
is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with
another or pursuant to a common design
with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the
other in accomplishing a tortious result,
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to
the third person.
4 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 876 (ed.
1979). We find subsection b to be controlling here.
Advice or encouragement to act acts as a
moral support to a tortfeasor, and if the
act encouraged is known to be tortious it
has the same effect upon the liability of
the advisor as participation or physical
assistance If the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing
the resulting tort, the one giving it is
himself a tortfeasor, and is responsible
for the consequences of the other's act.
This is true when the act done is an
intended trespass . . . when it is merely a
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negligent act The rule applies whether
or not the other knows his act is tortious
It likewise applies to a person
who knowingly gives substantial aid to
another who, as he knows, intends to do
a tortious act.
Id. at comment d.
Considering Moses' allegations, then, in
the light of this analysis, I would find that
she has made out a cause of action for
breach of confidentiality against Dr.
Krane. Her complaint outlined licensing
statutes and this Commonwealth's testamentary privilege statute, as well as the
Hippocratic Oath, and ethical considerations of the AMA. She has alleged that
Dr. Krane was her treating physician and
had gathered information about her from
their physician/patient relationship. She
has further alleged that because of that
relationship and because of these statutes
and considerations, Dr. Krane had a duty
to remain silent unless she gave her consent. She has alleged that Dr. Krane,
without informing either counsel or herself>
upon request by Underwriters, whom she
alleges was hired by Albert Einstein to
represent it in the underlying medical malpractice action, provided them with information and documents, even going so far
as to testify for them in that trial. I would
reiterate that this case is in its preliminary
stages. I would hold that the trial court
erred in dismissing Moses' complaint on
preliminary objections.

party's pleadings, giving that party the
benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from those facts. Curry v. Estate
of Thompson, 332 Pa.Super. 364, 368, 481
A.2d 65S, Wb {»&4>.
Taking as true all well-pleaded facts in
Moses' complaint, I would find that she has
made out a cause of action against Albert
Einstein, Underwriters, and McWilliams for
inducement of breach as well. Again, she
has alleged in her complaint that Albert
Einstein hired Underwriters to represent it,
and that Underwriters in turn hired McWilliams as counsel. She has also alleged that
Underwriters, through an employee, contacted Dr. Krane, and that Underwriters
arranged for McWilliams to speak with
him. She alleged that all actions of the
employees of Underwriters were done in
the scope of their employment, and that
McWilliams performed his duties with the
consent, approval, knowledge and cooperation of Underwriters. She has further alleged that all three appellees initiated, promoted, requested, encouraged and gave financial support to the unauthorized communications of Dr. Krane.

The remaining claims for inducement of
breach were dismissed by the trial court on
a motion for summary judgment. It is
axiomatic that summary judgment may be
granted only where there is no genuine
issue of material fact. The moving party
will then be entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law. Summary judgment
should be granted, however, only in cases
where the right to such judgment is clear
and free from doubt. Consumer Party of
Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa.
158, 175, 507 A.2d 323, 331 (1986). Further, the reviewing court must take as true
all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving

The inference may be drawn from these
facts that appellees intended to obtain from
Dr. Krane information that he had obtained
as a result of his fiduciary relationship
with Moses. Further, because appellees
knew that Dr. Krane was Moses' treating
physician, one may draw the inference that
they also knew that they were inducing a
breach of a fiduciary duty by requesting
and obtaining that information. I think
that Moses has pled sufficient facts to raise
the question of whether appellees were performing a tortious act in concert with Dr.
Krane, or giving substantial assistance to
him by asking for information protected by
the physician/patient relationship while being aware that divulging that information
was possibly tortious. These questions are
for the jury to determine. I do not find the
case to be free of doubt, or the outcome to
be prescribed by law. I would hold that
the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on the facts that are before us.3

3. We note also that Moses has alleged damages
because of injury to her nerves and psyche,

because of mental distress and embarrassment,
shame, and humiliation.
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I would find, therefore, that the need of
a patient's opponent in litigation to obtain
all information relevant to the patient's
physical condition does not necessarily
weigh so heavily against the desire of a
patient to keep confidential the information
disclosed during the physician/patient relationship that we must allow ex parte interviews with the physician involved as a result. I would not assign litigation costs
and time much value. I would add to the
balance, however, the public policy of this
Commonwealth which has always accorded
great importance to the confidentiality of
certain fiduciary relationships.4 This addition, I am certain, would make the balance
more even, if it did not, as it does to my
mind, tip the scales to the side of the
patient
In any event, I am of the opinion that
these competing interests can best be
served, not by permitting unauthorized or
nonconsensual disclosure of information,
but, as I have stated, through utilization of
the discovery process provided for by the
Commonwealth's rules of court. The supervision and judgment of the trial court,
allowing discovery of information and providing sanctions on misconduct, can best
mitigate the effects of a desire for disclosure on the one hand, and confidentiality on
the other. Cost is no basis for violating
the confidentiality of the relationship involved here.
I would find that the public policy of this
Commonwealth requires that a patient litigant be permitted to bring a claim against
his physician for breach of confidentiality,
and that ex parte discovery methods are
forbidden in cases in which the physician/patient relationship is integral, and
may give rise to a claim for that breach. I
would therefore reverse the order of the
trial court granting judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment for appellees
on Moses' claims for breach of confidentiality and inducement of that breach, and
remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
4. I also note my concern over what effect the
majority's decision will have on similar confidential relationships, for example, the attor-

DEL SOLE, Judge, concurring:
I join the majority in all respects save
one. I agree that when a patient files a
lawsuit claiming personal injury, that patient has consented to the disclosure of
relevant medical information by treating
physicians. Therefore, there was no
breach of the duty of confidentiality by Dr.
Krane in this case. There being no breach
of a duty, there can be no claim against the
remaining defendants for inducing the disclosure. Also, I agree that judicial proceeding immunity would protect all of the
defendants from claims for defamation.
I would not reach the issue of whether
judicial proceeding immunity protects a
person from liability for breaching a duty
of confidentiality. It is not necessary to
address that issue in this case. Also, since
the claim in a breach of confidentiality case
is based upon the fact something vms disclosed, not what was disclosed, I seriously
question whether immunity would be available in those situations.
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